Foraging for Information in the Prefrontal Cortex by Adams, Geoffrey Keith
 i
v 
 
 
Foraging for Information in the Prefrontal Cortex 
by 
Geoffrey Keith Adams 
Department of Neurobiology 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Michael L. Platt, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
R. Alison Adcock, Chair 
 
___________________________ 
Jennifer Groh 
 
___________________________ 
Marc Sommer 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Neurobiology in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
Foraging for Information in the Prefrontal Cortex 
by 
Geoffrey Keith Adams 
Department of Neurobiology 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
Michael Platt, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
R. Alison Adcock, Chair 
 
___________________________ 
Jennifer Groh 
 
___________________________ 
Marc Sommer 
 
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
Neurobiology in the Graduate School of 
Duke University 
 
2014 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Geoffrey Keith Adams 
2014 
 
  
iv 
Abstract 
The ability to monitor, learn from, and respond to social information is essential 
for many highly social animals, including humans.  Deficits to this capacity are 
associated with numerous psychopathologies, including autism spectrum disorders, 
social anxiety disorder, and schizophrenia.  To understand the neural mechanisms 
supporting social information seeking behavior requires understanding this behavior in 
its natural context, and presenting animals with species-appropriate stimuli that will 
elicit the behavior in the laboratory.  In this dissertation, I describe a novel behavioral 
paradigm I developed for investigating social information seeking behavior in rhesus 
macaques in a laboratory setting, with the use of naturalistic videos of freely-behaving 
conspecifics as stimuli.  I recorded neural activity in the orbitofrontal and lateral 
prefrontal cortex of monkeys as they engaged in this task, and found evidence for a rich 
but sparse representation of natural behaviors in both areas, particularly in the 
orbitofrontal cortex.  This sparse encoding of conspecifics’ behaviors represents the raw 
material for social information foraging decisions. 
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1. Introduction  
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we 
take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for 
themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a 
view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer 
seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of 
all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences 
between things. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1 
Translated by W. D. Ross 
Aristotle’s belief that “all men by nature desire to know” is often quoted as a 
pithy description of human inquisitiveness, but for Aristotle it was part of a larger 
philosophical argument.  If the desire for knowledge is an essential aspect of human 
nature, then it must serve some function (in Aristotle’s terminology, a “final cause”) 
toward human flourishing.  That is, we should understand innate human curiosity at 
least in part through a teleological lens.  Of course, Aristotle’s phrasing and perspective 
also reveal his cultural assumptions and philosophical commitments to the primacy of 
the human male.  But human curiosity knows no gender, and the motivation to seek 
information is found throughout the animal kingdom (Valone & Templeton 2002, Dall et 
al. 2005, Gottlieb 2012). 
Since Darwin’s theory of natural selection, modern biological theories of human 
and animal behavior also emphasize a teleological explanation of behavioral and 
cognitive traits, the concept of adaptive function.  Indeed, the question of adaptive 
function from Tinbergen’s “Four Questions” schema (Tinbergen 1963) is typically 
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identified with Aristotle’s final cause (Hladký & Havlíček 2013).  Though 
“hyperadaptationism” (Gould & Lewontin 1979) can lead to the adoption of implausible 
(and sometimes unfalsifiable) explanations for biological traits (Lloyd 2009, Sterelny 
2007), the concept of adaptive function nevertheless frequently provides a useful guide 
in inquiring into the causes of animal behavior.  The pitfalls of hyperadaptationism can 
be further avoided by pursuing along with adaptation explanations from alternative 
evolutionary mechanisms, including phylogenetic constraints, exaptation, 
developmental canalization, founder effects, and genetic drift.  In neuroethology, these 
various evolutionary mechanisms can represent a rich source of hypotheses for the 
proximate mechanisms of behavior, and discovered proximate mechanisms can provide 
evidence in support of or against these various evolutionary explanations. 
In this dissertation, I will undertake an investigation of the neural mechanisms 
involved in the exploration of the social environment, informed by a neuroethological 
perspective.  While the acquisition and use of social information has clear adaptive 
significance (Dunbar 1998, Valone & Templeton 2002, Dall et al. 2005, Dubois et al. 2011, 
Archie et al. 2012), my approach will also be informed by an exaptive program 
(Andrews et al. 2002) proposing a mechanistic and possibly evolutionary link between 
foraging behavior and social exploration on the basis of two observations.  First, there 
are formal similarities between the problems of foraging and information seeking 
(Stephens 1986, Pirolli 2007) suggesting that mechanisms which evolved to perform 
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computations for one of the two problems could have been subsequently exapted for the 
other.  Second, the brain areas I will be investigating, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), have been proposed to play a role in foraging and 
decision-making for nutritive rewards (Carmichael & Price 1996, Ongür & Price 2000, 
Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006, Cai & Padoa-Schioppa 2014) as well as social valuation 
and decision-making (Sallet et al. 2011, Watson & Platt 2012, Noonan et al. 2014, Cai & 
Padoa-Schioppa 2014). 
Chapter 2 was originally published as a review in Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology (2012), co-authored with Karli K. Watson, John Pearson, and Michael L. 
Platt.  It further develops the neuroethological approach to the study of cognitive 
processes, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between foraging and social 
information seeking that motivates my original study. 
Chapter 3 describes a novel experimental paradigm for investigating the neural 
mechanisms supporting social information foraging in rhesus macaques, and the 
behavioral and neurophysiological results of this study.  In it, I will describe novel 
evidence for the sparse encoding of natural, biologically significant viewed behaviors in 
the prefrontal cortex of monkeys watching videos of conspecifics.  This chapter 
represents the original research I performed during my doctorate studies. 
Chapter 4 closes with a discussion of the implications of the results presented in 
Chapter 3.  The role of prefrontal cortical areas in adaptive behavior and decision-
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making is an exciting, rapidly-changing area of research, and the interpretation of my 
findings is both informed by and informative toward this body of literature. 
1.1 The utility of social information 
Humans actively seek out information about their social partners’ emotions, 
beliefs, motivations, and relationships. This information is vital for producing 
appropriate behaviors during normal social interactions. Some sources of such 
information are immediately available during interaction with a social partner, such as 
the partner’s facial expressions. Other sources of social information are available without 
direct interaction, through observing a social partner’s behaviors and social interactions 
with others. In both cases, an individual must identify a potential source of social 
information, evaluate its likely significance, and experience motivation to track it. 
Abnormal social information seeking is a characteristic of a variety of neuropsychiatric 
disorders that affect social cognition, including autism spectrum disorders (ASD), 
schizophrenia, and social anxiety disorder, and the deficits to visual orienting behavior 
during viewing of naturalistic social scenes is predictive of the degree of overall social 
impairment (Klin et al. 2002).  In children with ASD, joint attention training, which 
directly targets deficits in social information seeking, can improve overall social 
functioning (Whalen & Schreibman 2003).  The fact that behavioral interventions during 
cognitive development which increase a patient’s attention to social information can 
lead to overall improvement in social function demonstrates that abnormal social 
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information seeking behavior is not only an effect of disrupted social cognition, but can 
also contribute causally to disrupting social cognition by depriving an individual of 
social information that is vital for its normal development. Despite the importance of 
social information seeking to normal human behavior and the devastating consequences 
of impairments in this behavior, the manner in which social information is transformed 
into a motivational code to guide orienting remains largely unknown. 
1.1.1 Social information in nonhuman primates 
Like humans, monkeys can learn about their social partners not only through 
direct interaction, but also by observing them as a non-participating third party (Lorincz 
et al. 1999, Bovet & Washburn 2003). Furthermore, monkeys discriminate between 
sources of information on the basis of their likely utility (Shepherd et al. 2006). For 
example, wild baboons exhibit enhanced orienting responses toward sources of 
information that reflect a change in relationships in their troop relative to sources of 
information which are consistent with well-established relationships (Cheney et al. 
1995). This and other studies provide good evidence that the social information seeking 
behavior of monkeys is fundamentally similar to that of humans. 
1.2 Internal and external validity 
Living systems are complex and contingent.  Removed from their natural 
context, their properties frequently change in response to the new environment.  It is this 
fact about biological systems that leads to a major issue in the methodology of the 
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biological sciences, the problem of balancing internal and external validity, which is also 
of great concern to clinicians, psychologists, and social scientists, for similar reasons.  
Internal validity refers to question of whether a study’s design is such that conclusions 
about the system under study (e.g., the physiology of laboratory animals’ brains) are 
sound, while external validity concerns the question of whether the system under study 
is representative of the population of interest (e.g., animals in the field) such that 
generalizing from the studied system is sound.  These two goals are frequently seen as 
being in tension with each other, as for many questions, high internal validity is 
provided by techniques which are only available in a laboratory setting or entail 
manipulating the system under investigation in ways that may render it dissimilar to its 
natural counterparts, reducing external validity. 
1.2.1 The clinic and the community 
A particularly illuminating example of how investigators are confronted with 
considerations of internal and external validity may be found in the history of 
neuropsychological studies of human patients with lesions of the prefrontal cortex.  In 
1985, Eslinger and Damasio reported the case of a patient, EVR, who had suffered an 
orbitofrontal meningioma, leading to broad bilateral lesions of the prefrontal cortex.  In 
their report, they wrote, “[t]he central finding was the dissociation between intact 
cognitive abilities measured by standardized tests, and the poor utilization of those 
abilities in the real environment.”  (Eslinger & Damasio 1985)  Prior to his tumor, EVR 
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was described by friends and family as extremely responsible, with a successful 
marriage and career.  Following the lesion, his behavior changed; he became unreliable, 
pursued risky business ventures which failed, lost his job, and eventually divorced his 
wife of 17 years; the full case report is a fascinating, if heartbreaking, story.  However, 
despite these obvious changes in behavior which so impaired EVR’s quality of life, the 
neuropsychological examination performed by Eslinger and Damasio revealed no 
obvious impairments.  Indeed, EVR’s intelligence was above average, and the clinicians 
appear to have been impressed with his conversational ability.  This disparity between 
findings of mild or no impairments in clinical assessments versus significant 
impairments to “real life” behavior is relatively common in case reports from the time of 
patients with prefrontal lesions, particularly when the damage is restricted to orbital and 
medial areas (Bigler 1988).  Indeed, although a number of clinical instruments to assess 
OMPFC function have been developed over the subsequent decades, accounting for the 
level of deficit in patients’ behavior in the community outside of the clinic remains a 
challenge (Zald & Andreotti 2010).  Perhaps the relatively simple environment of the 
clinic places weaker demands on the functions that these brain areas serve in natural 
behavior.  In practice, this literature also illustrates how clinicians leverage both the 
internal validity offered by reproducible neuropsychological instruments in the 
controlled environment of the clinic and the external validity offered by patient histories 
 8 
which include evidence from the more complex, ever-changing environment of the 
community. 
1.2.2 The laboratory and the field 
The use of animal models for understanding human physiology and disease also 
represents a compromise of external validity in favor of internal validity in order to 
apply techniques that would be impractical or unethical to apply to human subjects.  For 
those aspects of human physiology which have been highly conserved over 
evolutionary time, the likely reduction of external validity imposed by studying the 
homologous physiological process in an animal model may be minimal.  (If, that is, the 
trait has also been highly conserved in the model species since the common ancestor, a 
possibility which should not be overlooked.)  However, if a researcher is interested in 
investigating aspects of human physiology which are highly specialized or unique, then 
the implications of employing a model species must be considered carefully.  This is a 
problem which should be of particular interest to cognitive neuroscientists. 
The rhesus macaque is a commonly studied model organism for cognitive and 
systems neuroscience.  It represents an excellent choice for investigating the neural 
mechanisms underlying human cognitive processes.  Macaques share with humans a 
similar neuroanatomy, relative phylogenetic proximity with a common ancestor 
approximately 30 Mya (Wilkinson et al. 2011), and a broad array of natural habitats that 
place demands on cognitive flexibility.  Furthermore, a long history of comparative 
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neuroanatomical research (e.g., Ongür & Price 2000) serves to help clarify points of 
variation between the two species.  These factors all contribute to investigators’ ability to 
extrapolate from the results of studies in macaques to make inferences about neural 
mechanisms in humans. 
However, the discrepancy seen in prefrontal lesion patients between clinical 
observations and “real life” behavioral deficits should serve as a cautionary note here as 
well.  First, as a general principle, complex cognitive and behavioral phenomena may be 
difficult to characterize in the restrictive environment of the laboratory.  This may be 
particularly true for social behaviors, which require a level of free interaction between 
individuals that is difficult to accommodate in the laboratory setting.  Second, more 
specifically, the functions of the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex may be particularly 
difficult to characterize in the laboratory setting.  If the functional deficits caused by 
damage to these areas in human patients is obscured in the relatively limited 
environment of the clinic, then the normal functions of these areas may also be difficult 
to elicit in animals in the limited environment of the laboratory.  If this is indeed the 
case, then progress in understanding the function of prefrontal cortex in animal models 
may greatly benefit from considering in what ways the external validity of the 
experimental context can be improved. 
If, then, the rhesus macaque is to be a valid model for the neurobiological study 
of complex cognitive phenomena, we can benefit from employing tasks and stimuli 
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which are inspired by the conditions that free-ranging monkeys encounter in their 
natural habitats.  Such an approach has been successfully employed in capitalizing on 
monkeys’ innate fear responses to snakes, a naturalistic stimulus (e.g., Izquierdo et al. 
2005) and in simulated foraging tasks which are structured to resemble natural foraging 
problems (Hayden et al. 2011).  To understand the neural mechanisms underlying social 
information seeking behavior, a similar approach is warranted. 
1.3 Video stimuli: bringing the field to the lab 
There is a successful history in the use of video stimuli in studies of animal 
behavior (D’Eath 1998).  While there are a number of reasonable concerns about the 
external validity of video stimuli due to the fact that video recording and presentation 
devices are generally optimized for the human visual system, and non-human animals 
can differ significantly from humans in visual acuity, color perception, and temporal 
sensitivity, the success of video stimuli in driving animals to naturalistic responses in 
taxa as diverse as primates (Shepherd et al. 2010, Mosher et al. 2011), birds (Bird & 
Emery 2008, Rieucau & Giraldeau 2009), and arachnids (Tedore & Johnsen 2013) lends 
strong support to the notion that these stimuli are sufficiently naturalistic to have high 
external validity.  In rhesus macaques, the close similarity of the visual system to that of 
humans also reduces concerns that video stimuli may fail to adequately simulate natural 
visual stimulation, although subtle differences in color perception may be important to 
consider (Higham et al. 2010).  Furthermore, video stimuli in rhesus macaques 
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successfully elicit naturalistic visual orienting responses (Shepherd et al. 2010, Mosher et 
al. 2011, McFarland et al. 2013), suggesting that video stimuli presenting conspecifics 
engaged in species-typical behavior represents an excellent choice for studying social 
information seeking behavior. 
In humans, video stimuli have also proved to be a powerful tool for the 
investigation of brain function (Hasson et al. 2008).  Human subjects watching the same 
videos tend to have similar patterns of fMRI BOLD activity (Hasson et al. 2004), and by 
decoding BOLD activation patterns in visual cortex, the original video stimuli that 
elicited the neural responses can be recovered with some fidelity (Nishimoto et al. 2011).  
Furthermore, the semantic content of video stimuli appears to be represented broadly 
across the entire cortex (Huth et al. 2012).  These findings endorse the use of video 
stimuli as a means of engaging the brain in a naturalistic fashion to explore numerous 
dimensions of neural function simultaneously. 
In rhesus macaques, the use of videos of conspecifics as stimuli during 
electrophysiological recordings in the amygdala has found that individual cells in the 
amygdala respond to eye contact, that is, when the video-taped monkey looks directly at 
the camera, and the subject monkey looks at the eyes in the movie, simulating natural 
eye contact (Mosher et al. 2014).  Importantly, these responses were much weaker when 
static images were presented.  Presumably, the added naturalism of the videos, in which 
the observed monkeys exhibited biologically meaningful behaviors, encouraged the 
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more complete engagement of the subject animals’ nervous systems in the task of 
processing the presented stimuli. 
1.4 The orbitofrontal and lateral prefrontal cortex 
 The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), covering the ventral surface of the prefrontal 
lobe, has characteristically been associated with motivation, valuation, and hedonic 
pleasure (Rolls 2000).  However, its precise functions in producing behavior remain 
elusive. 
In animal studies, one of the most characteristic behavioral deficits associated 
with lesions of the OFC is to performance in reversal learning tasks (Murray et al. 2007). 
For these tasks, animals are trained on a cue-outcome association, for example, that a 
tone precedes a food pellet.  Both intact and OFC-lesioned animals can readily learn this 
initial association.  Once the association has been learned, the associated outcome is 
changed so that it is no longer desirable, for example from a food pellet to a foot-shock. 
Intact animals rapidly alter their learned behavior, but animals with OFC lesions are 
slower to do so (Murray et al. 2007).  A recent promising hypothesis for the role of OFC 
in learning suggests that the brain includes distinct learning systems for so-called 
model-free learning, in which learning occurs only by updating a value associated with 
an object or action, as well as model-based learning, in which animals learn the structure 
of relationships between cues and outcomes in the environment (Schoenbaum et al 2009, 
Walton et al. 2010).  According to this model for OFC function, it serves as the model-
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based critic, tracking the relative performance of the learned model’s predictions against 
the observed outcomes.  In the reversal learning paradigm, initial learning occurs with 
no prior model, and so only model-free learning is used.  However, as the animal forms 
the cue-outcome association, intact animals also train their model-based learning 
system, permitting more rapid subsequent reversal.  OFC-lesioned animals, lacking a 
properly-functioning model-based learning system, rely on the slower model-free 
system, thus perseverating on the initially-learned association. 
Another approach to investigating the function of OFC has been to understand 
the information coding scheme of individual neurons.  OFC units have been found to 
encode value (Tremblay & Schultz 1999) in a manner independent of the specific nature 
of the valuable stimulus (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006), leading to the suggestion that 
OFC firing rates represent a “common currency” value code for decision-making 
(Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006, Landreth & Bickle 2008).  According to this model, 
when animals have to make decisions between “goods,” that is, objects in the world (or 
laboratory simulacra thereof) toward which they might direct consummatory actions, 
OFC allows the animal to make the decision by reducing the large space of features 
describing the good to a single abstract value, and the value of goods on the menu can 
be compared and the largest selected.  Recent work has bolstered this model, and 
suggested that the process of converting the good-based decision signal into an action 
occurs in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) (Cai & Padoa-Schioppa 2014). 
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However, neural recordings in the OFC while monkeys made decisions about 
static social information found results not fully accounted for by this common-currency 
decision model (Watson & Platt 2012).  In this study, Watson and Platt trained monkeys 
to make decisions between a single drop of juice versus a drop of juice paired with a 
social image.  By varying the relative volumes of juice in each condition, an estimate of 
the common currency valuation of different categories of social images could be 
produced, in units of juice reward.  While the study revealed representations of both 
juice and social image value, there was a surprising discrepancy between monkeys’ 
decisions, which were driven primarily by the juice rewards, and the level of 
representation in OFC, with units encoding social value outnumber those encoding juice 
value by over a factor of two.  From the perspective of revealed preference, monkey OFC 
appears to dramatically over-represent social information.  However, from the 
perspective of ecological relevance, it is perhaps less surprising that social information, 
which can have tremendous utility over the life of a monkey, is well-represented in an 
area which may also play a role in learning a model of the environment (including the 
social environment), even if that information has little relevance to an immediate 
decision. 
The model of Cai and Padoa-Schioppa (2014) that OFC represents the valuation 
of goods while LPFC either performs or represents the outcome of the good-to-action 
transformation should also be considered within the context of strong evidence for a key 
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role in social function for LPFC as well.  Sallet and colleagues (Sallet et al. 2011) raised 
rhesus macaques in social groups of various sizes, and then performed volumetic 
analysis of structural MRIs of their brains, identifying a number of brain areas which 
were systematically associated with social group size and the individual’s dominance 
rank.  Intriguingly, among the identified areas was a region within the LPFC, on the 
ventral bank of the principal sulcus near its fundus (which they termed rostral 
prefrontal cortex, rPFC), which appears to correspond very closely to the region of LPFC 
investigated by Cai and Padoa-Schioppa.  This region included both an area associated 
with social group size, closest to the sulcal fundus, and an adjacent, more lateral area 
associated with dominance rank.  If this region of LPFC carries downstream value 
information from OFC in order to carry out a good-to-action transformation, then it 
seems plausible to conjecture that LPFC’s increased volume with social group size is due 
to increased demands for converting rich representations of social information in OFC 
into adaptive information-seeking behaviors.  
1.5 A social information foraging task 
To better investigate the roles of OFC and LPFC in social information seeking 
behavior, I devised a task in which monkeys made viewing decisions about naturalistic 
videos of freely-behaving conspecifics, described in Chapter 3.  To maximize the 
external validity offered by the use of such stimuli, the stimulus set was large and highly 
varied, such that monkeys saw the same sequence of video relatively infrequently, 
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typically at most once or twice per behavioral session.  In order to identify reliable 
patterns in the data, I took as my fundamental unit of analysis during video viewing the 
nature of the behaviors on display, rather than the repeated video clip.  That is, while a 
monkey saw an individual video sequence typically only once or twice in a session, 
there would be numerous examples of individual behaviors, such as allogrooming, on 
display, and by looking for regular responses to these viewed behaviors, patterns in the 
subject monkeys’ behavioral and neurophysiological responses could be identified. 
Decisions occurred on two scales.  First, the “micro-decisions” during video 
presentation: whether to look at the screen, and where to direct gaze.  Observations of 
monkeys’ gaze behavior during video presentation provided a powerful window into 
understanding what features and behaviors drove information-seeking at this scale.  
Second, “macro-decisions” between video presentations: what kind of information 
would be most valuable to see?  By allowing monkeys to make decisions between 
continuing to watch the video they had just seen versus switching to a new video, I 
expected to be able to make inferences about what types of social information were most 
valuable to the monkeys. 
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2. Neuroethology of decision-making 
A neuroethological approach to decision-making considers the effect of 
evolutionary pressures on neural circuits mediating choice. In this view, decision 
systems are expected to enhance fitness with respect to the local environment, and 
particularly efficient solutions to specific problems should be conserved, expanded, and 
repurposed to solve other problems. Here, we discuss basic prerequisites for a variety of 
decision systems from this viewpoint. We focus on two of the best-studied and most 
widely represented decision problems. First, we examine patch leaving, a prototype of 
environmentally based switching between action patterns. Second, we consider social 
information seeking, a process resembling foraging with search costs. We argue that 
while the specific neural solutions to these problems sometimes differ across species, 
both the problems themselves and the algorithms instantiated by biological hardware 
are repeated widely throughout nature. The behavioral and mathematical study of 
ubiquitous decision processes like patch leaving and social information seeking thus 
provides a powerful new approach to uncovering the fundamental design structure of 
nervous systems. 
2.1 Introduction 
In the natural world, animals face many difficult decision-making problems, 
posed by the details of their habitat and social system. Such problems can include when, 
where, and for what to forage; with whom to mate and where to nest; whether to flee or 
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to ignore a potential predator; and with which conspecifics to form long-term 
associations. Evolutionary theory and behavioral ecology identify such decision-making 
problems, and the costs, benefits, and constraints associated with pursuing specific 
behavioral strategies for solving them. 
Although the study of animal behavior has revealed a remarkable diversity of 
such problems and their solutions, mathematical analysis has demonstrated that 
dissimilar-seeming problems can be solved with similar strategies. For example, certain 
foraging problems can be generalized to a broad class of resource-seeking behaviors 
(Stephens & Krebs 1986). When the fitness impact of a decision is large, strong selective 
pressures should produce mathematically optimal behavior. Such a constraint means 
that the neurobiological mechanisms mediating decisions may be highly conserved or 
convergent across taxa for problems with similar mathematical formulations (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Depending on the mechanisms present in the ancestral state, dissimilar 
behavioral problems can be solved by common mechanisms, and similar behavioral 
problems can be solved by disparate mechanisms 
(a) Analogy for the relationships between algorithm, mechanism, and function. A 
fundamental design, the airfoil, can be configured into two very different forms: the 
wing and the fan. These more elaborate configurations may be further modified for 
use in multiple, unrelated functions, as in the use of helicopter blades for flying or 
fan blades for cooling. 
(b) We posit that the integrate-to-threshold algorithm, like the airfoil, is an 
evolutionary ‘building block’ that will be found frequently in various species and 
implementations. This algorithm can be implemented by several mechanisms, such as 
neural computational models as well as gene-regulatory mechanisms. As in (a), these 
specific mechanisms are integrated into the evolutionary toolkit, and made available 
for modification. Duplication and subsequent refinement of a particular mechanism 
can then adapt it to subserve a different behavior. For example, a neural mechanism 
that originally evolved to guide foraging behavior needs relatively small 
modifications before it can be implemented to enhance mate-seeking behavior. 
To illustrate these ideas, we will discuss two types of decision problem in 
behavioral ecology and their neural implementations. First, we will examine foraging, a 
prototype of environmentally based switching between action patterns to optimize 
resource gathering. Second, we will examine social information seeking behaviors in 
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non-human primates. We conclude that this work portends a more general 
understanding of decision-making and, ultimately, motivates the unification of 
theoretical and experimental work in behavioral ecology and neuroscience. 
2.2 Foraging decisions 
A well-studied example of a natural foraging decision is the patch-leaving 
problem, mathematically analyzed by Charnov (Charnov 1976) and first tested in a 
series of experiments in birds (Krebs et al. 1974). This problem considers an animal 
foraging in an environment with food items distributed in sparse patches. As the animal 
forages in a patch, local resources are depleted, and the time required to find a new food 
item increases, reducing the rate of food intake. As a result, animals must balance the 
benefits of diminishing returns against the costs of searching for new patches. The 
optimal solution to this problem, the Marginal Value Theorem (MVT)—that foragers 
should abandon patches when the local rate of caloric return falls below the average for 
the environment as a whole—has been demonstrated to hold in a breathtakingly wide 
array of species, including worms, insects, fish, rodents, birds, nonhuman primates, and 
humans (Stephens & Krebs 1986, Stephens et al. 2007). 
In a recent experiment investigating the neural basis of patch leaving decisions, 
Hayden, Pearson, and Platt (Hayden et al. 2011) designed a laboratory version of the 
problem in which monkeys chose between ‘stay’ and ‘leave’ options represented by 
visual stimuli on a computer monitor. The ‘stay’ option simulated foraging within a 
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gradually depleting patch by initially delivering a large juice reward, followed by a 
decreasing payoff on each sequential selection of ‘stay.’ The ‘leave’ option simulated 
travelling to a new, undepleted patch by incurring a ‘travel time’ before giving a juice 
reward and resetting the payoff associated with the ‘stay’ option. The travel time was 
explicitly cued to the monkeys by the height of a bar presented on the computer 
monitor, and was selected randomly for each new ‘patch.’ Monkeys readily optimized 
their patch residence times (Figure 2a) and their patch-leaving decisions also depended 
systematically on the ‘travel time’ to the next patch, a departure from the MVT 
consistent with observed behaviors in other species (Cuthill et al. 1990). Simultaneously, 
Hayden and colleagues recorded the firing patterns of single neurons in the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), an area of the macaque and human brain linked to 
reward monitoring, error signaling, learning, and behavioral control. Neuronal firing 
rates during the peri-saccadic decision-making period rose with each successive decision 
to stay in a given patch, across multiple actions unfolding over tens of seconds (Figure 
2b, c). An analysis of neuronal firing according to the monkeys’ patch residence times 
demonstrated that these responses were more closely related to the decision to leave a 
patch than to the monkeys’ patch residence times or reward rates (Hayden et al. 2011). 
This firing pattern revealed a strikingly simple implementation of a thresholded 
decision circuit. Using fMRI in humans, Kolling and colleagues (Kolling et al. 2012) 
investigated the function of ACC using a similar foraging task, and found that ACC 
 22 
tracks the value of foraging (i.e. leaving the current patch) on a scale anchored to the 
average value of the environment. While dACC appears to encode a signal that is 
compared to a threshold to determine the patch leaving decision, the mechanism by 
which this threshold is set remains unknown, but according to the MVT should be 
flexibly sensitive to environmental conditions such as average patch richness. 
 
Figure 2: Rhesus macaques forage nearly optimally in a computerized patch-leaving 
task, and the rising value of leaving a patch is represented by single neurons in the 
macaque frontal cortex. 
(a) Monkeys remain in the patch longer as travel time rises, as predicted by the 
marginal value theorem (MVT). Each dot indicates a single patch-leaving decision (n 
= 2834 patch-leaving events). The time at which the monkey chose to leave the patch 
(y axis) was defined relative to the beginning of foraging in that patch. Travel time 
was kept constant in a patch (x axis). Data from two monkeys are shown. Behavior 
(average is traced by the blue line) closely followed the rate-maximizing leaving time 
(red line), albeit delayed by 0–2 s. (b) Peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) for an 
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example cell in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Neurons responded phasically 
around the time of decision-making saccades and then fell to a baseline level between 
trials. Time zero indicates end of saccade, indicating choice. Black rectangle indicates 
the average duration of the trial. The firing rate during the peri-saccadic decision-
making period rose with each successive decision to stay in a given patch, across 
multiple actions unfolding over tens of seconds. Each panel indicates responses 
selected from one range of patch residence times. (c) Average responses of example 
neuron occurring in a series of 1-s peri-saccadic epochs. Firing rates increased as time 
in patch increased. Error bars represent s.e.m. Firing rates peaked with the decision to 
abandon a patch and move on to the next. Figure after Hayden et al. (2011), used with 
permission. 
The rise-to-threshold process evident in the decision-related responses in ACC 
mirrors similar rise-to-threshold processes evident in the activity of neurons in parietal 
and prefrontal association cortex in monkeys rendering perceptual judgments (Gold & 
Shadlen 2007). While such perceptual judgments entail the integration of sensory 
evidence from a noisy environment over time until a threshold is reached, similar 
integration is not immediately apparent in ACC firing during this patch foraging task. 
Nevertheless, both algorithms entail threshold comparison, and variability in neural 
firing determines the monkeys’ decisions. Further, such rise-to-threshold processes have 
been theorized to serve as implementations of the sequential probability ratio test 
(SPRT)—the optimal solution to this type of binary decision problem (Wald & 
Wolfowitz 1948, Ratcliff 1978, and Ratcliff & McKoon 2008). The observation that a 
similar process appears to govern both perceptual decisions and patch leaving decisions 
endorses the idea that the brain uses a small suite of similar, repeated mechanisms to 
solve diverse problems in multiple domains (Hayden et al. 2011). 
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Recent evidence also indicates that genes coding for neuromodulatory chemicals 
may mediate the impact of local environmental conditions on patch leaving decisions, 
perhaps by controlling the threshold for patch leaving. Bendesky and colleagues 
(Bendesky et al. 2011) compared patch-leaving decisions by a nematode (C. elegans) 
strain from Hawaii with one developed in the laboratory. Hawaiian worms abandoned 
algae lawns at ten times the rate that the laboratory strains did. The authors found that 
differences in patch-leaving threshold among distinct strains resulted from 
polymorphisms in promoter regions of the tyramine receptor gene (tyra 3b), which 
controls the expression of a G-protein coupled receptor analogue of vertebrate 
catecholamine receptors. Thus worms’ patch leaving thresholds are regulated 
genetically, as opposed to monkeys’ use of flexible thresholding, though both obey the 
MVT. In other words, different proximal mechanisms are capable of instantiating the 
same algorithm to solve a computationally equivalent biological problem. 
Intriguingly, the invertebrate catecholamines tyramine and octopamine, which 
bind to the tyra3 receptor, are closely related structurally to the vertebrate 
neuromodulator norepinephrine, which has been hypothesized to regulate 
exploration/exploitation tradeoffs in primates and humans (Aston-Jones & Cohen 2005, 
Cohen et al. 2007). It is tempting to speculate that individual differences in exploration 
behavior, an innate tendency to abandon the current behavioral strategy for another 
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potentially more profitable one, might also be mediated in humans through genetic 
influences on catecholaminergic neuromodulatory systems (Frank et al. 2009). 
In a remarkable illustration of the idea that similar decision-making problems 
may be solved by widely disparate mechanisms following similar strategies, the nest site 
selection behavior of honeybees has been found to be governed by much the same 
integrate-to-threshold process as the foraging behavior of monkeys and worms (Seeley 
et al. 2012). In this case, it is the individual animal that is the basic unit of information 
processing rather than the single neuron. Individual bees dance to accumulate evidence 
in favor of a nest site, while other bees that suffered predator attacks at that site ‘head-
butt’ the dancers, a stop signal that inhibits dancing. When the evidence in favor of a 
nest site reaches a threshold, the entire swarm mobilizes to the selected site. Notably, 
this research was motivated by predictions derived from findings in macaques, 
demonstrating the predictive potential of the comparative neuroethological approach 
(Marshall et al. 2009). Furthermore, the same dancing and head-butting mechanism is 
also used in the selection of foraging sites, lending support to the idea that a mechanism 
evolved to solve one decision-making problem may also be applied to solving a different 
but similar one. 
2.3 Social information seeking 
Social information seeking, like foraging, is a process of accessing a variably 
distributed resource, under the constraint of costs associated with the search behavior. 
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Information about social partners can be valuable in a wide variety of contexts, such as 
mate choice, foraging, and nest site choice, and the strategies used to solve one class of 
problem, such as foraging, may also be applied to another class of problems, such as 
social decision-making. 
Thus the primacy of information in guiding decisions is abundantly evident in 
the social behavior of primates. Primates have frontally oriented, mobile eyes with a 
central fovea composed of a high density of cone photoreceptors, and thus are not 
capable of sampling all regions of the visual field simultaneously. This set of adaptations 
has led to the evolution of mechanisms that orient the visual system to objects with high 
information value via overt and covert attention (Moore et al. 2003). In the context of 
foraging, information is given value as a consequence of the value of the nutriment it 
may yield, as when an animal evaluates a tree for the presence of ripe fruit. But animals 
living in complex and dynamic societies can use the same attentional strategies to gather 
information about others (Klein et al. 2008), including rank (Bovet & Washburn 2003), 
identity (Parr et al. 2000), group membership (Mahajan et al. 2011), direction of gaze 
(Lorincz et al. 1999, Deaner & Platt 2003, and Ferrari et al. 2000), and emotional state 
(Sackett 1966). 
While behavioral and physiological evidence demonstrates the value of 
information to primates in decision-making, information seeking also has associated 
costs. By contrast with foraging, for which locomotion imposes high energetic costs, the 
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metabolic costs of information seeking are quite low. However, information seeking can 
impose time costs, requiring animals to forego activities such as sleeping, drinking, or 
eating, which demand postures or behavioral states incompatible with attentive 
orienting (Figure 3a). Other costs are social: in the case of rhesus macaques, visual 
fixation on the face of another individual invites aggression (van Hooff 1967). 
Furthermore, inappropriate information seeking (e.g. directing attention to low-value 
information) can result in missed opportunities to gather more useful information 
elsewhere. These tradeoffs are part of the decision-making problem that social animals 
must solve in allocating their time and attention to social information seeking behaviors. 
 
Figure 3: Social information is a valuable resource for macaque monkeys. 
(a) A rhesus macaque on Cayo Santiago assumes a vulnerable posture (left) to drink 
from a puddle, but periodically interrupts this posture in order to visually scan the 
surrounding region for potential threats (right). There are no predators on the island, 
but aggressive social interactions are commonplace. (b) Values determined for 
different image classes for two male monkey subjects (open and closed bars), in ms of 
fluid delivery time. Positive deflections indicate the subject was willing to forgo fluid 
to view that image class. Negative deflections indicate the subject required fluid 
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overpayment to choose that image class. Hindquarters refer to the perineal sexual 
signals of familiar females. Dominant and subordinate refer to the faces of familiar 
dominant and subordinate males. Gray refers to a plain gray square matched for size 
and luminance to the other image classes. Behavioral data depicted here correspond to 
neural data depicted in Figure 4, below. Photographs by K.K. Watson. 
Thus, as in foraging, adaptive choices during information seeking depend on the 
assessment and comparison of associated costs and benefits. Deaner, Khera and Platt 
(2005) demonstrated that thirsty male rhesus macaques will forego a small amount of 
juice in order to acquire specific types of social information, such as reproductive signals 
(i.e. female perinea) or the faces of dominant males, but will not do so for other types of 
social information, such as the faces of subordinates (Figure 3b). By contrast, monkeys 
look longest at reproductive signals but quickly avert gaze from both dominant and 
subordinate faces. These two observations invite the hypothesis that although both 
sexual signals and status-related signals contain high information value, there is a high 
cost associated with an extended period of direct eye contact. In support of this 
interpretation, a genetic polymorphism in the serotonin system associated with 
heightened anxiety elicits reduced attention to the faces of other monkeys, greater pupil 
dilation (a somatic index of elevated autonomic arousal) in response to faces of 
dominant males, and reduced reward value for viewing the faces of dominant males 
(Watson et al. 2009) in rhesus macaques. 
Multiple cortical and subcortical brain areas are specialized for processing social 
information. Regions in the temporal and occipital lobes are specialized for processing 
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social information in humans and macaques, suggesting adaptation for the rapid 
assessment of visual social information. Humans and macaques both possess multiple 
brain regions, identified by functional imaging and confirmed by recordings from single 
neurons, exquisitely selective for faces (Kanwisher et al. 1997, Tsao et al. 2003). Neurons 
in other temporal lobe areas encode head direction (Perrett et al. 1985), face identity 
(Perrett et al. 1984), or biological motion (Oram & Perrett 1994). Cortical thickness in 
both temporal and prefrontal areas increases with increasing social group size in 
macaques (Sallet et al. 2011). 
Subcortical structures play a particularly critical role in encoding affective 
properties of social stimuli. For example, the amygdala is known to encode stimulus 
salience, and damage to this region disrupts face processing and produces abnormal 
social approach behavior (reviewed in Adolphs 2010). In addition, fMRI studies reveal 
that many parts of the canonical subcortical reward circuit, most notably the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc), are activated by visual social rewards (Smith et al. 2010), social 
approval (Rademacher et al. 2010), aversion to social inequity (Tricomi et al. 2010), and 
charitable donations (Carter et al. 2009). The special role of NAcc in social interaction is 
endorse by animal research showing, for example, that D2 receptor manipulation in 
NAcc alters partner preference in mating voles (Gingrich et al. 2000), and that μ-opioid 
receptor manipulation in NAcc alters social play behavior in rats (Trezza et al. 2011). 
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These populations of neurons are interconnected and feed forward from the 
temporal into the frontal lobe, where various features of external stimuli, including their 
motivational value, are integrated (Ku et al. 2011). The architecture of this network 
suggests that decision-making mechanisms may have privileged access to social 
information in human and nonhuman primates alike. We conjecture that a common 
suite of algorithms, and perhaps mechanisms, subserves both ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ 
decision processes, with the former differentiated from the latter by the large number of 
specialized circuits used for detecting and processing information related to 
conspecifics. 
Moreover, studies of neural activity in the primate brain support the notion that 
information itself has value for making decisions. Dopamine neurons, which respond to 
unpredicted primary reinforcers (such as nutritive rewards) and cues predicting 
reinforcers, also encode monkeys’ preferences for advance information about the content 
of impending choices (Bromberg-Martin & Hikosaka 2009). Moreover, firing of neurons 
in lateral intraparietal area (LIP), a region of visuomotor cortex thought to encode a 
salience map of the visual world (Goldberg et al. 2006, Bisley & Goldberg 2010), varies 
with the value of social images displayed in the neurons’ receptive fields. Neurons in 
LIP not only encode the value of the juice reward monkeys will gain for orienting to a 
particular location (Platt & Glimcher 1999), but also the intrinsic biological value of the 
social information they receive for orienting to the same location (Klein et al. 2008). 
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When monkeys are given the opportunity to either maximize a juice reward or display a 
social image, LIP neurons respond to both the amount of juice received and to the value 
of the social reward (Figure 4). Importantly, social and gustatory value are encoded 
independently along the same axis, suggesting that LIP plays a role in assigning value to 
a particular location in space, irrespective of the nature of the resource being sought. 
Thus, neurons in parietal cortex—a final common pathway for information seeking 
behavior—automatically integrate the intrinsic biological value of social agents into 
salience maps guiding orienting. 
 
Figure 4: The value of social information is signaled by neurons in the macaque 
visual orienting system. 
(a) Average firing rate for 34 LIP neurons plotted against time for all trials in which 
the subject chose to view the image (T2) in the neuron's response field, separated by 
image class. (b) Average firing rate of the population for all trials in which the subject 
chose to view the image (T2) in the neuron's response field, separated by fluid value 
relative to the non-chosen target (T1). (c) Firing rates during the 200 ms after target 
onset, plotted as a function of image value (left) and as a function of difference in 
fluid payoff between T2 and T1 (right). Regressions were performed on all data in 
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which the subject chose to view the image. The data in (c) were binned for display, 
but all regressions were performed on raw data. **p < 0.001. Figure after Klein et al. 
(2008), used with permission. 
2.4 Discussion 
The study of ecological decision-making suggests that natural selection has 
favored a set of simple, repeated design patterns: basic circuit elements capable of being 
implemented by many biological configurations. Instead of forming a single unified 
system for decisions, these local circuits might be capable of functioning independently 
for specialized subclasses of action planning and selection, as well as being recruited 
across regions for more complicated behaviors. Just as Gigerenzer has suggested that 
human decision processes draw on a well-stocked ‘adaptive toolbox’ filled with 
inexpensive, approximate heuristics, so evolution appears to favor repeating algorithms, 
despite disparate implementations (Gigerenzer & Selten 2001). 
In this view, the study of a decision-making problem like patch leaving is 
valuable not only because it is ubiquitous, but also because the algorithm used to solve 
it—comparison of local returns to a fixed threshold—represents one of the simplest 
forms of a single-input/single-output control system, in which the controller implements 
a binary threshold operation (Brogan 1985). Any neural system capable of implementing 
such a circuit is likewise applicable to an extremely wide class of problems, one that 
extends far beyond foraging. In fact, a more general version of such a system, the 
Kalman filter, is known to be an optimal solution to the problem of predicting returns 
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under fairly general assumptions, and thus for fine-tuning behavior in response to 
changing environmental conditions (Brogan 1985, Anderson & Moore 1979). That such a 
system is linear, that it requires only a simple architecture, and that it is robust against 
noise all lead us to expect that it will not only appear in a wide diversity of species, but 
that it may be repeated and repurposed within a single brain to solve seemingly 
unrelated problems. In fact, such observations motivate a neural engineering viewpoint 
in which the unique classes of problems faced by an organism become primary, 
followed by the algorithms used to solve them, and only lastly their specific neural 
implementations (Marr 1982). 
This does not mean, however, that comparative biology or neurophysiology 
become irrelevant for understanding decision-making. On the contrary, this 
evolutionary viewpoint suggests that algorithms implemented in simpler nervous 
systems are more generally applicable than we might have thought. Just as in vision or 
olfaction, the insights gained from studying flies or worms suggest possibilities at the 
algorithmic level in birds or primates. And though the details may differ as organisms 
become capable of more generalized and flexible behaviors, the same simple biological 
components, coupled like circuit elements, may likewise be expected to give rise to 
startlingly sophisticated generalizations (Brogan 1985). 
Many models of decision-making, particularly those derived from economics, 
describe the decision process as a linear sequence: estimating the abstract utility of 
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several possible outcomes or behavioral plans, directly comparing these utilities, and 
finally selecting the goal or behavior associated with the highest utility (Glimcher 2004, 
Padoa-Schioppa 2007, Lee 2006, Glimcher et al. 2005, Sugrue et al. 2005). In some cases, 
such models leave the exact nature of the abstract utility undefined. Here, however, we 
have presented a ‘bottom-up’ as opposed to ‘top-down’ perspective, in which simple, 
reusable decision rules are implemented repeatedly to solve various decision-making 
problems across a diverse range of taxa. Owing to the rules’ algorithmic similarity, their 
output could mistakenly be attributed to a single decision-making system. We argue 
that these design patterns, implemented by diverse suites of neural hardware, should 
nonetheless prove ubiquitous on evolutionary grounds, and that their simplicity and 
robustness should favor them both for convergent evolution and conservation within 
taxa. Such ideas represent a new opportunity for both systems theory and comparative 
biology, since the view of decision systems as evolving primarily to solve ecological 
problems demands renewed interest in both engineering disciplines and animal 
behavior. Indeed, the search for reusable design patterns in neural systems may provide 
a unifying framework for biological decision making in much the same way it has for 
vision and motor control. 
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3. Sparse coding of viewed natural behaviors in the 
prefrontal cortex 
3.1 Materials & Methods 
3.1.1 Behavioral paradigm 
Three adult male rhesus macaques participated in this study. During an 
experimental session, subjects sat in a primate chair (Crist Instruments, Hagerstown, 
MD) in a darkened room with a computer monitor.  Stimuli were displayed on the 
monitor under the control of custom scripts programmed in Matlab (The Mathworks, 
Natick, MA) with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard 1997).  Monkeys’ eye 
movements were optically tracked at 1000 Hz via real-time pupil detection using an 
Eyelink 1000 system (SR Research, Mississauga, ON, Canada), and subjects were trained 
to interact with the task control system by making eye movements.  The optical gaze 
tracker was calibrated prior to each behavioral run with a custom nine-point calibration 
routine.  Juice rewards were delivered to a tube placed at the monkeys’ lips from a 
reservoir by opening a solenoid valve, or by a peristaltic pump. 
Monkeys initiated each trial by fixating a black circle positioned centrally on the 
computer monitor against a gray background for 500 ms.  Upon successful fixation, the 
fixation target was removed, and either two (90% of trials) or one (10% of trials) 
eccentric colored choice targets were presented.  Monkeys selected one of the targets by 
making a saccade, and the color of the target selected indicated a type of video 
presentation to follow.  For each trial, the targets presented (the “menu”) were randomly 
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selected from a larger set of possibilities.  The complete set of options were targets 
yielding the following video presentation outcomes: Blank (indicating the presentation 
of a blank screen for 5 s), Switch (indicating the presentation of a 5 s video clip randomly 
chosen from the whole set), Continue (indicating the resumption of playback of the 
previous trial’s video clip for an additional 5 s), and Repeat (indicating the repetition of 
the previous trial’s 5 s video clip).  In some sessions, Repeat was not included in the set 
of options.  Upon registration of the monkey’s choice, there was a brief (randomized 
between 100 and 600 ms) delay, followed by video playback for 5 s as determined by the 
selected target.  Following video playback, there was a brief (randomized between 50 
and 500 ms) delay, and then monkeys were rewarded with a drop of juice for 
successfully completing the trial.  Juice rewards were fixed, not depending on monkeys’ 
viewing decisions or gaze behavior.  A visual schematic of the trial structure is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5: A schematic diagram of a task allowing monkeys to view and make 
decisions about social information. 
3.1.2 Video stimuli 
A stimulus set consisting of 4.87 hours of video in 429 files was recorded in 
August 2009 at the Caribbean Primate Research Center’s Cayo Santiago facility, a field 
station located on a small island populated by approximately one thousand rhesus 
macaques.  Human researchers and technicians visit the island daily, and the monkeys 
are accustomed to the presence of human observers.  During filming, the intended goal 
was to obtain a set of videos representing a wide range of natural behaviors.  Videos 
included no cinematographic edits (e.g., cuts), but due to the highly dynamic and 
unpredictable environment of the island did include changes in zoom level and camera 
movements, in order to both capture behaviors of interest and to allow the videographer 
to safely move in response to potentially aggressive monkeys. 
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For compatibility with the experimental control software, all video files were 
converted to Apple Quicktime format at 610 width by 458 height resolution and 30 
frames per second.  Because the sound track’s quality was highly variable, and 
frequently included vocalizations from animals out of frame which were unrelated to 
the visible events, audio was removed from all videos. 
To assess subject animals’ behavioral and neurophysiological responses to the 
conspecific behaviors displayed in the video stimuli, we coded all videos using an 
ethogram of rhesus macaque behavior.  Our ethogram was developed based on a 
previously published ethogram of rhesus macaque behavior (Partan 2002), but tailored 
for the constraints of the videos and the demands of the study.  Videos were coded 
using the software program Tinbergen, an open-source program written in Python by 
Geoffrey K. Adams to assist with the behavioral coding of videos of animals, available 
online at the URL http://github.com/biogeo/tinbergen.  Tinbergen provides a simple video 
playback interface alongside a behavioral coding interface to allow a researcher to mark 
the starts, stops, and changes of state of behaviors seen in the videos in a project-specific 
ethogram.  These events are stored in a simple plain-text file format which can be read 
and used by custom analysis software. 
In addition to behaviors, additional descriptors of the video scenes were coded.  
Although the videos included no cinematographic edits (e.g., “cuts”), camera 
movements and changes in zoom level were included, and these events were coded 
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along with the behavioral events.  As well as permitting the effect of exogenous changes 
in visual orientation to be investigated, camera movements are associated with large-
scale optic flow.  The number of monkeys present in the scene was also coded.  Because 
the face and ano-genital regions are areas of particular biological significance, the view 
levels of face and hindquarters were also included in the coding scheme.  The complete 
coding scheme, including behaviors and these view-related events (which in total we 
will refer to as the “ethogram” for simplicity despite its inclusion of non-behavioral 
observations) used for coding videos is shown in Table 1.  Some ethogram entries were 
coded categorically, always in one of several mutually exclusive “levels,” while the 
remainder were coded in a binary fashion, always either occurring or not occurring. 
Table 1: Ethogram used for coding videos 
Event name Levels Description 
Camera 
movement 
holding The camera is not moving much, holding a mostly 
stable image 
 zooming in The camera is holding a mostly stable image, but is 
zooming in 
 zooming out The camera is holding a mostly stable image, but is 
zooming out 
 tracking The camera is tracking the movements of a monkey, 
holding it largely stable against the moving 
background 
 panning The camera is moving without tracking anything, and 
the scene is still viewable 
 slewing The camera is moving wildly and the scene is difficult 
to view 
Count 0 The number of monkeys visible in the scene, 
 1 coded in approximately logarithmically-spaced 
 2 levels 
 3-5  
 40 
 6-10  
 >10  
Human 
visible 
 Whether human researchers are visible in the scene 
Face 
visibility 
none No faces are visible with a view angle (the angle 
between the camera and the head axis) of less than ca. 
100 deg. 
 small At least one face is visible with a view angle of less 
than ca. 100 deg., but none subtend a linear extent of 
greater than ca. 10% of the width of the video 
 away At least one face is visible with a view angle of between 
ca. 45 and 100 deg., and subtends a linear extent of 
greater than ca. 10% of the width of the video 
 direct As “away,” but the view angle is less than ca. 45 deg. 
 eye contact As “direct,” but the monkey also appears to be looking 
directly at the camera 
Ano-genital 
area visibility 
none The ano-genital area (AGA) is defined as the glabrous, 
red skin around the genitals, anus, and upper inner 
thigh (the “sex skin”), the scrotum on males, and the 
ischial callosities. The AGA of no monkeys is visible. 
 small At least one monkey’s AGA is visible, but none are 
prominent on the screen. 
 unsexed At least one monkey’s AGA is prominently visible, but 
the observer is unable to sex the animal 
 male At least one male monkey’s AGA is prominently visible 
 female At least one female monkey’s AGA is prominently 
visible 
 both At least one male and one female monkeys’ AGA are 
visible 
Drink  Any visible monkey is drinking water 
Forage no No monkeys are engaged in foraging behavior. 
 few One or two monkeys are in a foraging state, 
characterized by various specific actions such as 
manipulating or ingesting food. 
 many Three or more monkeys are engaged in foraging 
behaviors. Due to the rapid increase in complexity of 
coding specific actions with this number of foraging 
monkeys, specific actions are only coded during the 
“few” condition. 
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Search  Searching for a food item by manipulating foliage, 
ground substrate, or a pile of provisioned food items 
Grasp food  Reaching for a food item; begins at initiation of the 
reach movement and ends once the food item is in 
hand 
Hold food  A food item is visibly held in hand or foot 
Hold food in 
mouth 
 A food item is visibly held in the mouth; carrying food 
in cheek pouches is not included 
Manipulate 
food 
 Active manipulate of a food item other than grasping 
or ingesting, e.g. “washing” 
Ingest food  A food item is brought to the mouth. Begins at 
initiation of arm movement and ends when the food 
item is consumed or the hand leaves the mouth area. 
Includes movements of food item towards the mouth 
that do not actually result in consumption, e.g., 
“sniffing” 
Ingest 
grooming 
manipuland 
 A hand is brought from a grooming target (self or 
partner) to the mouth, as if the monkey is consuming a 
parasite plucked from the skin 
Chew  Rhythmic jaw movements; an entire bout of chewing is 
coded rather than individual bites 
Retrieve 
from pouch 
 A food item is brought out from the cheek pouches 
Heave  A full body movement involving tightening of the 
abdomen and straightening of the esophagus, as 
though the monkey is preparing to vomit or in the act 
of vomiting 
Scratch  Rhythmic, vigorous movement of the hand or foot 
against the monkey’s own body 
Autogroom  Self-directed grooming behavior; involves more finely 
controlled hand and finger movements than scratching 
Allogroom  Other-directed grooming behavior; allogroom and 
autogroom involve similar motor actions, differing 
only in the target 
Solicit 
allogroom 
 A monkey approaches another monkey and sits or lies 
down, presenting itself for grooming 
Aggression 
level 
none No aggression is present in the scene 
 unidirectional A single individual is displaying aggressive behaviors 
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 bidirectional Two individuals are displaying aggressive behaviors 
toward each other 
 joint Two or more individuals are jointly displaying 
aggressive behaviors, the target(s) of which may or 
may not be visible 
 intercoalition Two “coalitions” are displaying aggressive behaviors 
toward each other 
Strike  A monkey makes brief, aggressive physical contact 
with another, excluding shoving infants by adult 
females 
Grapple  Two monkeys engage in prolonged aggressive physical 
contact 
Lunge  A monkey makes a short, aggressive movement toward 
another monkey 
Withdraw  A monkey backs away from another monkey while 
making aggressive or submissive displays 
Charge  A monkey makes a rapid, prolonged aggressive 
movement toward another monkey 
Flee  A monkey moves away from another monkey at high 
speed 
Chase  One monkey charges another monkey as it flees 
Threaten  A monkey performs a threat display, characterized by a 
round open mouth, prolonged staring, head bobbing, 
piloerection, and erect posture 
Mounted 
threaten 
 One monkey mounts another while both threaten a 
third monkey 
Submit  A monkey performs a submissive display, 
characterized by bearing teeth, squeaking, and 
withdrawn posture 
Displace  One monkey walks directly toward or near another, 
which moves away 
Lean away  A monkey posturally shifts away from an approaching 
conspecific without fully withdrawing or displacing 
Avoid  A monkey pauses or alters course during movement to 
maintain greater distance to another monkey 
Branch 
display 
 A monkey vigorously shakes a branch or branch-like 
object (e.g. a metal pole) 
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 For use with quantitative analyses, the coding ethogram was then slightly altered 
to represent categorical entries as a set of related binary entries.  Additionally, some 
behaviors in the original ethogram occurred insufficiently frequently to permit analysis 
with neurophysiological data (see below), but belonged to a natural semantic class of 
behavior, and were thus pooled for this purpose. Table 2 shows these derivative 
ethogram elements. 
Table 2: Derived ethogram elements 
Event name Definition 
Camera zooming in “Camera movement” is “zooming in” 
Camera zooming out “Camera movement” is “zooming out” 
Camera tracking “Camera movement” is “tracking” 
Camera panning “Camera movement” is “panning” 
Camera slewing “Camera movement” is “slewing” 
Count >= 1 “Count” is “1,” “2,”, “3-5,” “6-10,” or “>10” 
Count >= 2 “Count” is “2,”, “3-5,” “6-10,” or “>10” 
Count >= 3 “Count” is “3-5,” “6-10,” or “>10” 
Count >= 6 “Count” is “6-10” or “>10” 
Count >= 11 “Count” is “>10” 
Visible face “Face visibility” is “small,” “away,” “direct,” or “eye contact” 
Prominent face “Face visibility” is “away,” “direct,” or “eye contact” 
Direct face “Face visibility” is “direct” or “eye contact” 
Eye contact “Face visibility” is “eye contact” 
Visible genitals “AGA visibility” is “small,” “unsexed,” “male,” “female,” or 
“both” 
Prominent genitals “AGA visibility” is “unsexed,” “male,” “female,” or “both” 
Male genitals “AGA visibility” is “male” or “both” 
Female genitals “AGA visibility” is “female” or “both” 
Foraging “Forage” is “few” or “many” 
Group foraging “Forage” is “many” 
Any aggression “Aggression level” is “unidirectional,” “bidirectional,” 
“joint,” or “intercoalition” 
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Mutual aggression “Aggression level” is “bidirectional,” “joint,” or 
“intercoalition” 
Joint aggression “Aggression level” is “joint” or “intercoalition” 
Intercoalition 
aggression 
“Aggression level” is “intercoalition” 
Attack Any of “Strike,” “Grapple,” “Charge,” “Lunge,” or “Chase” 
Threaten Any of “Threaten,” “Mounted threaten,” or “Branch display” 
Submit Any of “Withdraw,” “Flee,” “Chase,” “Submit,” “Displace,” 
“Lean away,” or “Avoid” 
 
 When used in the quantitative analyses below, ethogram entries were coded as 
“1” when present and “0” when absent in the video scene.  A schematic of these values 
during a selected section of an example session is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Schematic representation of ethogram values during video presentations 
from a selected section of one behavioral session 
Each horizontal row of traces represents the value of one ethogram entry over time, 
and each vertical column of connected traces represents a single 5-second video 
presentation. Adjacent columns represent presentations from consecutive trials. 
3.1.3 Measurements of gaze during video presentation 
To interpret subject monkeys’ gaze behavior during video playback, we 
transformed the gaze signal reported by Eyelink, a 1000 Hz signal with values reported 
in the computer display’s pixel coordinate system, to a spatio-temporal coordinate 
system more easily comparable to the presented videos.  The gaze position signal was 
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temporally downsampled to 30 Hz via boxcar averaging, minimizing the phase delay 
between the video frame drawing times and the centers of the boxcar windows, and 
spatially rescaled to a normalized coordinate system in which the vertical extent of the 
video is 1 and the origin is in the center of the video.  We will refer to the reported 
position of gaze in this transformed coordinate system as the gaze focus, and note that 
each video frame in a presentation had exactly one associated gaze focus value, unless 
the optical tracker failed to detect the pupil due to the monkey’s eye being closed.  We 
further defined a criterion for gaze focus being in frame: it must be within a rectangle 
defined by the video frame with a buffer on each side of 0.05 normalized units (i.e., 5% 
of the height of the video).  Numerically, the vertical coordinate must be in the interval [-
0.550, 0.550] and the horizontal coordinate in the interval [-0.716, 0.716] for gaze focus to 
be in frame. 
Videos of conspecifics frequently elicit characteristic gaze orientation patterns in 
rhesus macaques (Shepherd et al. 2010, Mosher et al. 2011, McFarland et al. 2013).  
Qualitatively, this result was borne out in our task as well.  To quantify the extent to 
which monkeys repeated their gaze patterns across multiple viewings of the same video 
sequence, we compared all observations of gaze focus for individual frames.  We 
introduce a novel metric summarizing the relationship between these observations, 
which we term gaze consistency.  The metric is mathematically analogous to the potential 
energy of a collection of electrically-charged particles, with each “particle” representing 
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the focus of a monkey’s gaze in a particular video frame from a single viewing.  That is, 
for a particular video frame, we collect all observations of gaze focus which were in 
frame, each a vector denoted by 𝒙 with a subscript.  The “energy” associated with a pair 
of gaze observations 𝒙𝑖 and 𝒙𝑗 is then given by 
𝑣𝑖𝑗 =
𝑑0
max(‖𝒙𝑖 − 𝒙𝑗‖, 𝑑0)
 
where 𝑑0 represents the smallest distance between two points considered to represent a 
meaningfully different focus of gaze (here, 𝑑0 was 1% of the height of the video, 4.58 
video pixels, or approximately 0.23 degrees of visual arc).  The gaze consistency for a 
particular video frame is then the mean “energy” between all pairs of gaze points, 
𝑔 =
2
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
∑∑𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑗<𝑖𝑖
 
Gaze consistency is a metric which has a theoretical maximum value of 1 if all 
observations of gaze were to fall within a disc of diameter 𝑑0, and decreases toward zero 
with greater disparity in the focus of gaze upon repeated viewings of the same video 
frame.  Importantly, gaze consistency is only moderately sensitive to the presence of 
multiple clusters of gaze focus.  A single tight cluster of gaze focus yields a greater 
consistency value than two such clusters, but two clusters yield a greater gaze 
consistency than a diffuse “cloud” of gaze focus, a feature which is not true for, e.g., the 
covariance of gaze focus.  Thus gaze consistency values tend to track, in an ordinal 
fashion, the qualitative sense of “clustered-ness” in the gaze focus observations. 
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In addition to gaze consistency, we also introduce the related metric gaze 
typicality, which indexes how similar a particular observation of in-frame gaze focus is to 
other observations for the same video frame.  This is defined as the average “energy” of 
all pairs involving that observation: 
𝜏𝑖 =
1
𝑛 − 1
∑𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
 
Like gaze consistency, gaze typicality theoretically ranges between zero (highly 
atypical gaze) and one (highly typical gaze).  The gaze typicality for a particular 
observation of gaze focus is high when there are many similar such observations for that 
frame, and low when it is distant from other observations of gaze focus. 
Conceptually, gaze consistency is a property associated with a video frame, and 
periods of high gaze consistency indicate video sequences which present features or 
events which are potent attractors of gaze, irrespective of the particular nature of those 
features or events.  By contrast, gaze typicality is a property associated with an 
individual gaze trace, and indicates the extent to which the animal’s gaze during a 
particular video presentation was attracted to the regions which, on average, tend to 
attract gaze.  Gaze consistency and typicality are useful metrics for the interpretation of 
gaze behavior in a large, diverse stimulus set, offering the advantages of being location-
independent (i.e., it does not matter where in the visual field a feature may be) and 
simple to calculate.  However, it is important to interpret these values carefully, as they 
are highly sensitive to the relative size of features in the visual field.  In particular, a 
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scene containing a feature which is a potent attractor of gaze but spans a large region of 
the visual field will tend to yield lower gaze consistency than one which contains a 
similar feature which spans a smaller region of the visual field. 
Gaze consistency and gaze typicality were calculated only for frames with at 
least five in-frame observations of gaze focus, and gaze typicality was additionally only 
calculated for in-frame gaze focus.  These criteria yielded gaze consistency values for 
501,377 video frames (out of 527,480 total frames) and 11,520,724 gaze typicality 
observations (out of 12,619,650 frame presentations).  In addition to these metrics, we 
also examined whether each gaze focus was in frame (gaze onscreen), and the overall 
proportion of in-frame gaze focus for all viewings of each frame (proportion gaze 
onscreen). 
3.1.4 Surgery 
All procedures were approved by the Duke University Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee and were designed and conducted in compliance with the Public 
Health Service’s Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals.  A small prosthesis 
for head restraint was implanted in each monkey using standard sterile surgical 
techniques.  Following a six week recovery period, the monkeys were trained to perform 
eye movement tasks for fluid rewards.  A second surgery was then performed to place a 
Cilux plastic recording chamber (Crist Instruments, Hagerstown, MD) above the 
prefrontal cortex.  Monkeys received analgesics and antibiotics during recovery from 
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both surgeries.  After implantation, the recording chamber was routinely treated with 
antiseptic flushes, including before and after each recording, and between recordings 
was kept sealed with sterile caps. 
3.1.5 Electrophysiological recordings 
We recorded action potentials from 63 single units from the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC) in the principal sulcus (monkey C: 31, monkey E: 32) and 56 single units 
from the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (monkey C: 29, monkey E: 27).  Recordings were 
performed using either single-wire tungsten microelectrodes (Fred Haer Co., Bowdoin, 
ME) or an 8-channel multicontact probe (U-Probe, Plexon Inc., Dallas, TX) configured 
with two tetrode clusters.  During recordings, the probes were guided to the intended 
recording site using a hydraulic microdrive (David Kopf Instruments, Tujunga, CA). 
Target recording sites were determined through the conjunction of several 
techniques.  All recordings were performed using a standard recording grid (Crist 
Instruments, Hagerstown, MD).  Structural MRIs were obtained for monkeys E and C, 
and the distances between the dorsal surface of the brain below each grid hole and the 
intended recording sites were measured.  Observations of changes in audible broad-
band power and multi-unit activity electrophysiological landmarks during the 
positioning of the electrode prior to recording (as determined by sending the amplified 
electrophysiological signal to a speaker) were used to further confirm the recording site.  
Finally, additional anatomical information was obtained via ultrasound imaging 
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through the recording chamber (Glimcher et al. 2001) using a hand-held digital 
ultrasound device (SonoSite 180, FUJIFILM SonoSite, Inc.). 
3.1.6 Statistical models and regularization technique 
Statistical analyses were performed using standard packages and custom 
software in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA), R (R Core Team 2014), and MySQL. 
In investigating the effects of viewed behaviors on subject monkeys’ behavioral 
and physiological responses, an unusual challenge is posed by the complexity of the 
viewed naturalistic scenes.  Each item in the ethogram represents a potential regressor 
which could be included in a statistical model.  Crucially, this set of regressors is highly 
correlated, and including all these regressors in a standard statistical model (e.g., a 
generalized linear model [GLM]) substantially increases the likelihood of over fitting, 
unstable fits due to multicollinearity, and reducing power due to over-partitioning the 
variance (a version of the so-called “large p, small n” problem).  To address these issues, 
we modeled behavioral and physiological responses with GLMs with so-called “elastic 
net” regularization (Zou & Hastie 2005), a technique which has been successfully 
applied in several areas of biostatistics and which has empirically been demonstrated to 
perform well with large numbers of correlated regressors (Hastie et al. 2009).  A full 
discussion of elastic net regularization is beyond the current scope, but briefly, elastic 
net regularization introduces a penalty term, λ, acting on both the sum of the absolute 
values of the regression coefficients (the L1-norm) and the sum of the squares of the 
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regression coefficients (the L2-norm).  These two penalties are weighted relative to one 
another by another parameter, α.  Due to the L1 penalty, as λ increases, coefficients for 
regressors which are only weakly associated with the model’s response variable tend to 
be forced to exactly zero, effectively excluding “non-significant” regressors from the 
model completely.  Due to the L2 penalty, coefficients for regressors which are highly 
correlated with one another tend to be included or excluded from the model as a group. 
A key challenge with the elastic net model centers on finding an appropriate 
choice of the parameters α and λ, since these control the relative weight given to the 
model error and model complexity terms. The strategy most commonly used in such 
situations is cross-validation (Hastie et al. 2009).  The model is trained using multiple 
parameter values on a subset of the original data, and its predictive accuracy for each set 
of parameters is then calculated based on the data not used for training (hold-out or test 
data). The values of the parameters selected are those which produce best performance 
on the held-out data. In k-fold cross-validation, this process of training and testing is 
repeated k times, each time with a different subset of data withheld. The test accuracy 
from these k steps is then averaged to give a more accurate estimate of model error and 
thus better parameter selection. 
The performance of the elastic net model at various values of λ can be compared 
by calculating the deviance, a goodness of fit metric related to the log likelihood of the 
data, given the model and parameters.  The distribution of the deviance function is 
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estimated by k-fold cross validation: the observations are partitioned into k test sets, and 
for each test set the model is first fit on the complement training set and then deviance is 
computed on the test set, yielding k estimates of the deviance function.  Conventionally, 
the largest value of λ which produces a deviance within one standard error of the 
minimum deviance is selected (𝜆1SE) (Friedman et al. 2010).  Intuitively, this may be 
thought of as selecting the most conservative (i.e., most highly-constrained) model 
which is reasonable given the (more permissive) best-performing model.  To illustrate 
the selection procedure, Figure 7 presents the relationship between λ and the coefficient 
fits and cross-validated deviance for the neuronal firing rate model fit result shown in 
Figure 17. 
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Figure 7: Illustration of coefficient selection under elastic net regularization. 
(a) As the elastic net constraint parameter λ increases, regressor coefficients are 
constrained towards zero, with weaker predictors of the response variable being 
forced to exactly zero at weaker constraint levels, and strong predictors being forced 
to zero only at strong constraint levels.  Each trace represents the value of one 
coefficient at various constraint levels. (b) Model performance varies with λ.  Model 
performance at various constraint levels is assessed by cross-validation, with lower 
deviance values indicating superior performance.  Error bars represent standard error 
across the cross-validation test sets.  For this illustrative model, a broad range of weak 
constraint levels performed similarly well, and the strongest of these (𝝀𝟏SE) was 
selected. 
Because elastic net regression is a relatively new technique, hypothesis testing 
under it remains an active research topic (c.f. Lockhart et al. 2014). However, in cases 
where such tests are not available, we can use permutation tests to generate 
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distributions from the null hypothesis for comparison with observed data.  Such tests 
entail comparing model performance on the true data set to model performance on 
artificial data sets formed by randomizing the relationship between the regressors and 
the response variable.  These tests do not necessarily provide p-values, but do provide 
rigorous and meaningful control over Type I error rates. 
We applied elastic net regularization to several models which included ethogram 
variables as regressors, using the R package “glmnet” (Friedman et al. 2010).  In all cases 
we identified 𝜆1SE via 20-fold cross validation and report the coefficients associated with 
this constraint level. 
3.1.7 Analysis of video selection decisions 
We observed 86,893 viewing decisions (monkey C: 42,229, monkey E: 29,951, 
monkey H: 14,713), 74,874 of which occurred following the presentation of a movie 
rather than a blank screen on the previous trial (monkey C: 34,296, monkey E: 27,109, 
monkey H: 13,469).  To determine the extent to which the offered menu and behaviors 
seen in the previous trial’s movie influenced decision-making, we constructed a model 
as follows.  First, the menu options were assigned an arbitrary ranking: Blank=0, 
Repeat=1, Continue=2, Switch=3.  This selection of rank ordering will have no influence 
on the inferences of the model; it simply defines a convention for coding its inputs and 
outputs.  For each (non-forced) decision, the response variable was assigned 1 for 
selection of the higher-ranked option, and 0 for the lower-ranked option.  Next, for each 
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of Repeat, Continue, and Switch, a regressor was assigned 1 if it was the higher-ranked 
option of the menu, -1 if it was the lower-ranked option of the menu, and 0 if it was not 
offered.  (For example, if on a particular trial the menu was Repeat and Switch, then the 
regressors for Repeat, Continue, and Switch would be -1, 0, and 1, respectively.)  Blank 
was treated as a baseline comparison condition and thus not assigned a regressor.  Then, 
ethogram variables were assigned 1 if the entry occurred at all during the previous 
trial’s video presentation, and 0 otherwise.  Finally, we identified a model according to 
which each viewing decision d was a Bernoulli trial with parameter 𝑝𝑑, with 𝑝𝑑 
depending on the menu regressors and ethogram variables via the logistic function 
through the following equation (Model 1): 
ln (
𝑝𝑑
1 − 𝑝𝑑
) =∑𝜐𝑖𝑚𝑑,𝑖
𝑖
+∑∑𝛽𝑖,𝑘𝑚𝑑,𝑖𝑥𝑑,𝑘
𝑘𝑖
 
where i indexes the three menu regressors, k indexes the ethogram variables, 𝑚𝑑,𝑖 is the 
menu regressor for option i, 𝑥𝑑,𝑘 is the ethogram variable for entry k, 𝜐𝑖 is a coefficient 
representing the overall utility of option i, and 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 is a coefficient representing the 
change in utility of option i when ethogram item k was previously viewed.  We then fit 
the coefficients 𝜐𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 to the data using the previously described elastic net 
technique, with 𝛽𝑖,𝑘 subjected to the elastic net penalty while 𝜐𝑖 were not. 
3.1.8 Analysis of gaze during video presentation 
To assess subject monkeys’ overall engagement with the presented videos as 
assessed by oculomotor orienting toward the stimuli, we pooled gaze data from 84,131 
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five-second video presentations (monkey C: 39,945; monkey E: 26,644; monkey H: 
17,542), and for each frame in each presentation (521,059 frames total) identified whether 
gaze focus was within frame, “gaze onscreen” as defined above.  We constructed a 
model treating each observation of gaze onscreen as a Bernoulli trial with parameter 𝑝𝑓, 
with 𝑝𝑓 depending on the state of the video’s ethogram for frame f via the logistic 
function, (Model 2) 
ln (
𝑝𝑓
1 − 𝑝𝑓
) =∑𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑓,𝑘
𝑘
 
where 𝑥𝑓,𝑘 represents the value (zero or one) of the k’th ethogram element for video 
frame f, and 𝛽𝑘 is an associated coefficient.  This model treats the monkey’s probability 
of looking at the presented video as a function of the sum of independent effects 
associated with each of the various ethogram events that may be occurring at any time.  
We then fit the coefficients β to the data using the previously described elastic net 
technique. 
To assess how viewed behaviors might influence monkeys’ gaze behavior within 
the video frame, we also computed gaze consistency for this set of observations.  To 
improve interpretability, we standardized gaze consistency by subtracting its mean and 
dividing by its standard deviation over the full set of observations.  We then constructed 
a simple model treating each such observation as being drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 𝜇𝑓, with 𝜇𝑓 depending on the state of the video’s ethogram for 
frame f (Model 3): 
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𝜇𝑓 =∑𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑓,𝑘
𝑘
 
(Note that 𝛽𝑘 here is a distinct symbol from its appearance in the previous equation.)  
The coefficients β were then fit to the data using the previously described elastic net 
technique. 
3.1.9 Analysis of neuronal firing rates 
To explore the relationship between task events and prefrontal neuronal firing 
rates, we constructed peri-stimulus time histograms with 33 1/3 ms bin widths (i.e., 30 
bins per second, chosen to match the video frame rate). 
To investigate the relationship between viewed behaviors and neuronal firing 
rates during video presentation, we pursued a model wherein the number of spikes 
produced by a neuron followed a Poisson distribution with parameter 𝜙𝑛,𝑡, where n 
indexed distinct video presentations and t the time within presentation.  This rate 
parameter depended on an intrinsic baseline rate 𝜙0 modulated by a set of ethogram 
variables 𝑥𝑘,𝑛,𝑡−𝜏, where we introduced the time delay τ to account for the latency for 
visual information to arrive in the prefrontal cortex.  That is, spikes at time t occurred in 
response to visual stimuli at time 𝑡 − 𝜏. 
However, we also observed that two additional factors influenced neuronal 
firing: first, many units showed characteristic firing rate profiles over time during video 
presentation (Figure 13, Figure 14); and second, many units exhibited slow “drift” in 
their baseline firing rates which occurred on the timescale of minutes.  The characteristic 
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within-presentation timecourse we labeled 𝜋𝑡, which was calculated using peri-stimulus 
time histograms over all video presentations.  The drift factor we labeled 𝛿𝑛, and 
calculated it according to the following algorithm.  1: For each trial n, we calculated the 
number of spikes observed in the 500 ms prior to the start of the trial, multiplied by two 
to give the “baseline spike rate.”  2: Smooth these values with a 21-trial moving average.  
3: To compensate for very low firing rates in some units, add a “floor effect” of 0.0476 
Hz, equivalent to observing one spike in 42 500-ms windows and representing a 
reasonable upper bound on the unit’s true baseline firing rate if no spikes were 
observed.  4: Normalize these values by dividing by the mean over all trials, and assign 
this as 𝛿𝑛. 
Finally, we constructed a model for the firing rate of prefrontal neurons during 
video presentation relating these various terms (Model 4): 
ln(𝜙𝑛,𝑡) = ln(𝜙0𝜋𝑡𝛿𝑛) +∑𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑛,𝑡−𝜏
𝑘
 
where 𝛽𝑘 are coefficients representing the effect of each of the ethogram variables on the 
neuron’s firing rate.  Note that by exponentiating, this equation can be rewritten as: 
𝜙𝑛,𝑡 = 𝜙0𝜋𝑡𝛿𝑛∏𝛾𝑘
𝑥𝑘,𝑛,𝑡−𝜏
𝑘
 
where 𝛾𝑘 = exp(𝛽𝑘), which emphasizes that this model treats each item in the ethogram 
as having a gain-like effect on the firing rate of the cell. 
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 Because some behaviors in the ethogram occurred relatively infrequently, it was 
possible for our observations of neural firing to include only a small number of 
presentations involving these behaviors.  This was of concern not only because of the 
small sample size, but also because with only a small number of exemplars of a 
particular behavior, it is impossible to determine whether changes in neural firing rate 
were due to the behavior itself or an unrelated event that happened to co-occur with the 
behavior in one or two of the presentations.  Therefore, for each item in the ethogram, 
we required that it be present in at least 5 distinct presentations for its regressor to be 
included in the model. 
 We were also interested in how PFC neurons’ firing rates related to monkeys’ 
gaze behavior.  As estimators of intrinsic elements of the video scene that influenced 
monkeys’ gaze, we included gaze consistency and the proportion of gaze-out-of-frame 
observations as regressors along with the ethogram variables.  As estimators of per-view 
decision processes, we included gaze typicality and gaze-out-of-frame as regressors as 
well. 
 A final problem which remained was the principled selection of the “information 
latency” parameter τ and the window duration w used to count spikes.  To select τ, we 
observed that those units in our population which exhibited changes in firing in 
response to video onset did so with a latency of approximately 100 ms (Figure 14), a 
value which is in accord with previous studies of these areas (Thorpe et al. 1983), and so 
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selected τ = 100 ms.  The selection of w offered greater challenges.  Because both 
neuronal firing rates and ethogram regressors are temporally autocorrelated, selection of 
an analysis window shorter than the scale of neural firing rate autocorrelation would 
bias our model toward false positives, due to the fact that adjacent bins would be highly 
correlated in the data while treated as independent by the model.  Conversely, selection 
of too large an analysis window would risk failing to adequately represent some of the 
briefer behaviors in the ethogram.  Therefore we explored neuronal firing rate 
autocorrelations during video presentation in our data set (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Autocorrelation in neuronal firing rate during video presentation, LPFC 
example unit 
On the basis of this exploratory analysis, we selected a 200 ms window as 
sufficiently conservative.  Thus, each presentation was divided into twenty-five 200 ms 
observations of neuronal firing rate, each of which could be considered roughly 
independent for the purposes of statistical analysis.  Because the observation window 
was larger than a single 33 1/3 ms video frame, ethogram values were averaged over the 
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window to compute the regressors.  We then fit the coefficients β to the data using the 
previously described elastic net technique. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Monkeys’ viewing preferences for naturalistic videos 
 All three monkeys displayed marked preferences among the four menu options 
(Figure 9).  Notably, for all three monkeys, the least preferred option was Blank, and the 
most preferred was Switch, suggesting a general preference for video stimuli over blank 
screens, and for unpredictable video stimuli over stimuli predictable from the previous 
trial’s presentation. 
 
Figure 9: Each subject exhibited clear preferences among viewing outcomes. 
Each vertical pair of bars represents one “menu” of paired options presented to the 
subject. The relative height of each bar indicates the proportion of decisions for the 
associated option in that menu. (Monkey C: 42,229 decisions, Monkey E: 29,951 
decisions, Monkey H: 14,713 decisions) 
 Contrary to our original expectations, our model of presentation decisions, 
Model 1, failed to discover any effect of viewed behaviors on subsequent decision-
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making, yielding no non-zero coefficients for the option-ethogram interaction terms for 
any of the subject monkeys.  However, the model did allow us to estimate utility 
coefficients for the menu options, 𝜐𝑖 (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10: Menu option utilities for each subject 
From the original construction of the model, the probability of a monkey 
selecting one option from a pair is given by the logistic function of the utility difference 
between the two options.  Intuitively, the greater the utility difference between two 
options, the more likely the monkey is to select the larger-utility option.  Had any effects 
of viewed behaviors been found, these would have been interpretable as additional 
(positive or negative) utility imparted to a viewing outcome by the previously-viewed 
behavior.  The absence of such utility suggests that either monkeys’ decision-making 
was driven solely by presentation outcome type rather than video subject matter, or the 
ethogram failed to capture those aspects of the viewed behaviors which were 
 64 
biologically meaningful to subject monkeys.  However, the relationship between subject 
monkeys’ gaze behavior and the viewed behaviors suggests that the ethogram did in 
fact capture elements of the video presentations which were meaningful to subject 
monkeys. 
3.2.2 Viewed behaviors influence monkeys’ gaze behavior 
The fit for the model of gaze onscreen, Model 2, against the data revealed that 
most of the ethogram entries had some influence on the likelihood that gaze focus was 
in frame (Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: Features of viewed video scenes, including conspecific behaviors, 
influenced monkeys’ decisions to look at or away from the presented video at each 
frame. 
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The result of this model may be interpreted analogously to that of the decision-
making model.  At any time, the subject monkey is deciding whether to direct its gaze 
toward or away from the video frame, and that decision a function of the utility of the 
video at each time.  Overall, the presented videos carry a high utility, as evidenced by 
the subject monkeys’ overall decision to look in frame 91.7% of the time (out of 
12,619,650 frame presentations) and indicated by the large intercept term fit by the 
model, but viewed features and behaviors add to or subtract from that utility. 
Of particular note, camera movements in general seemed to enhance the visual 
interest of the video, with the exception of the wild “slewing” camera movements 
during which individual features in the video were difficult or impossible to distinguish.  
“Tracking” camera movements, in which the camera followed a moving animal to 
stabilize it in the frame, were particularly efficacious at attracting gaze to the scene.  
Monkeys’ probability of looking at the video also increased with increasing numbers of 
conspecifics visible, with a particularly large increase associated with the second visible 
monkey (“Count >= 2”).  By contrast, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the 
prominent visibility of a face (“Face prominent”) decreased the probability of looking at 
the video.  However, this is consistent with previous findings that the utility of social 
information may be decoupled from looking-time in rhesus macaques for face stimuli 
(Deaner et al. 2005), perhaps because direct gaze is a threatening behavior in this species 
(van Hooff 1967). 
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In addition to these purely visual features, several behaviors significantly 
influenced the decision to look at the video.  Aggressive behavior (“Any aggression”) 
increased the probability of looking at the video, with prolonged aggressive physical 
contact (“Grapple”) being particularly effective at attracting gaze to the scene.  
Submissive displays (“Submit”) were also effective attractors of gaze to the overall 
scene.  Among the foraging behaviors, “Group foraging,” “Hold food in mouth,” and 
“Retrieve from cheek pouch” were particularly effective at attracting gaze to the video, 
the first of these likely reflecting the high information density when numerous 
conspecifics are behaving in the scene, and the latter two possibly indicating that close 
proximity of a food item to a conspecific’s mouth is highly salient for rhesus macaques.  
Somewhat surprisingly, “Allogroom” was associated with a reduction in the probability 
of looking at the video, despite its well-established importance for establishing and 
maintaining social relationships in macaques (Dunbar 2010).  We speculate that because 
allogrooming is typically a lengthy behavior during which novel information for an 
observer is unlikely after the initial observation, the marginal utility of continued 
observation is low, decreasing the utility of continuous attention to the behavior for an 
external observer. 
Beyond the decision to look in or out of frame, we were also interested in 
characterizing monkeys’ gaze behavior within the presented video frames, to better 
understand how viewed behaviors influence visual exploration.  Theoretically, we might 
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have modeled this as a multinomial decision process analogous to the binomial decision 
to look within or away from the video screen, wherein the visual scene would be 
partitioned into regions identified by the features and behaviors occurring within them, 
each imparting a utility toward the subject’s decision to direct its gaze to that region.  
However, hand-coding all such regions in over 500,000 video frames in order to build 
the model was impractical.  Nevertheless, our ethogram gave us the time, if not the 
location in space, of our features of interest.  Therefore we introduced the gaze 
consistency metric to attempt to index the reliability in the gaze behavior without 
explicit reference to spatial location within the video frame.  Our inference was that the 
same process which would reliably drive gaze toward specific features in the scene 
would tend to reliably influence gaze consistency.  Fitting our model of gaze consistency 
to the data revealed that it was modulated by a number of features and behaviors 
(Figure 12), demonstrating that despite its limitations it was successful in indexing some 
aspects of the subjects’ reliability in gaze behavior with respect to the ethogram. 
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Figure 12: Differences in the reliability of gaze across repeated viewings of the same 
video sequence associated with features of the video scene, including conspecific 
behaviors, were successfully captured by the gaze consistency metric and associated 
model. 
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However, the nature of the gaze consistency metric means that the results of this 
model fit must be interpreted with some care.  For example, observing the original 
videos with pooled observations of gaze focus makes it apparent that monkeys tend to 
consistently foveate male genitals when they are presented, yet the model reports a low 
gaze consistency associated with periods when male genitals are visible on screen.  
(Although note that because “Male genitals” is a nested regressor within “Prominent 
genitals” and “Visible genitals,” the total gaze consistency prediction for periods when 
male genitals are visible on screen is therefore the sum of these three values.  The 
comparatively large negative value for “Male genitals” indicates a low gaze consistency 
compared to what would be expected for prominently visible genitals overall.)  
However, this result is sensible when the nature of the feature is considered.  Because of 
the scrotum, the adult male ano-genital area (AGA) is comparatively larger and visible 
at a wider range of viewing angles than that of females or juveniles (juveniles 
comprising the majority of the “unsexed” prominently visible AGAs in the video 
database).  This means that the male AGA tends to subtend a larger area for visual 
exploration than that of females or unsexed individuals even at the same relative 
distance, camera zoom level, and posture.  Thus, multiple gaze foci within the male 
AGA are more likely to be more widely separated compared to multiple gaze foci within 
a non-male AGA, hence the negative effect of the factor “Male genitals” on gaze 
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consistency.  The result of the model for this feature reveals a limitation of gaze 
consistency as a metric. 
Despite this important caveat, the model fit to the gaze consistency data reveals a 
number of intriguing patterns.  As with gaze-in-frame probability, gaze consistency 
decreased with the presence of a prominently visible face in the scene.  However, unlike 
gaze-in-frame probability, which showed little change as the view of a face moved from 
prominent, to direct, to making eye contact with the camera, the trend for gaze 
consistency reversed, rising with these increasingly “intense” views of a face.  This is 
consistent with previous findings that monkeys’ scan patterns of faces tend to be highly 
stereotyped.  Also notable is the comparatively large increase in gaze consistency 
associated with “Submit,” which parallels the increase in gaze onscreen probability, 
suggesting that submissive displays were of great visual interest to subject monkeys.  By 
comparison, the increase in gaze consistency was much more modest for “Threaten,” 
and no effect was found for this behavior on gaze-in-frame probability.  We speculate 
that this difference may exist because while both of these behaviors are highly 
informative social signals, subject monkeys may have been more prone to quickly avert 
their gaze from threat displays, as under natural conditions prolonged eye contact with 
a threatening conspecific could provoke an attack. 
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3.2.3 Prefrontal neurons respond robustly to videos of conspecifics 
and sparsely represent viewed behaviors 
To explore the relationship between task events and prefrontal neuronal firing 
rates, we constructed peri-event time histograms for all main task events (fixation onset, 
choice target onset, choice registration, start of video playback, end of video playback, 
and juice delivery).  A striking result was that many units in both OFC and LPFC 
displayed strong responses to video playback (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Individual PFC units respond strongly to videos of conspecifics. 
Each panel displays the mean firing rate of a unit in an epoch triggered by one of the 
major task events.  Epochs are partially overlapping.  (a) Example LPFC unit.  (b) 
Example OFC unit. 
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To assess how the population of units in each area as a whole responded to each 
of the main events in the task, we also examined the mean normalized firing rate across 
the population of units within LPFC and OFC (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14: PFC population-averaged responses to task events. 
For each unit, firing rates were normalized to the 500 ms prior to fixation onset.  Each 
trace represents the mean normalized firing rate across the population for those trials 
in which the monkey selected “Blank” (blue), “Continue” (green), or “Switch” (red). 
Because the option “Repeat” was included only for a subset of units, it is omitted 
from the data shown.  (a) LPFC units. (b) OFC units. 
The mean population firing rates reveal a number of interesting patterns.  Both 
OFC and LPFC responded to the presentation of choice targets, but did not appear to 
discriminate among the selected options in the mean firing rate response.  LPFC, as a 
whole, responded vigorously and phasically to the onset of video presentations, but not 
to the blank screen condition (which involved no change in the visual stimulus).  OFC, 
by contrast, appeared to show a greater overall increase in activity during video 
 74 
presentation, and a marked phasic response to the end of the video (at which time the 
screen returned to a neutral gray color).  Intriguingly, LPFC exhibited a phasic response 
to the delivery of juice following a blank presentation, but not a video presentation. 
However, the mean population response failed to capture the considerable 
heterogeneity across the population in the presence, magnitude, and sign of modulation 
in response to each of the task events, which was better seen by investigating the mean 
responses of each unit individually (Figure 15).  Within both LPFC and OFC, many units 
deviated from the pattern shown by the population averages, suggesting that there was 
considerably more information contained within the activity of these ensembles as a 
whole than is reflected in the population mean. 
 
Figure 15: PFC units’ responses to task events were heterogeneous. 
Each horizontal row represents one individual unit’s peri-event activity, and the color 
of each cell indicates the normalized firing rate during a time bin. Units are ordered 
within each region by mean normalized firing rate during the video presentation 
epoch. 
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We were further interested in identifying whether behaviors viewed during 
video presentation had any impact on the firing rates of PFC neurons.  We began with a 
simple approach of comparing the overall firing rate of PFC neurons during video 
presentation to the firing rate only when particular behaviors were occurring (Figure 
16). 
 
Figure 16: PFC units’ firing rates were modulated by viewed behaviors during video 
presentation. 
Connected lines represent PSTHs during presentation of a movie (purple) or blank 
screen (green), with 200 ms bins.  Unconnected points represent mean firing rates for 
each bin across only those presentations in which foraging (cyan) or allogrooming 
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(red) was occurring.  Because behavioral events did not necessarily span the entirety 
of a 5 second video presentation, each point may represent bins from a different 
subset of the total presentations. (a) LPFC example.  This unit exhibited markedly 
greater firing rates when allogrooming was occurring, and lower firing rates when 
foraging was occurring, compared to the overall mean firing rates at each time during 
movie presentation. (b) OFC example.  This unit exhibited lower firing rates when 
allogrooming was occurring, but did not appear to be notably modulated by foraging. 
This approach yielded promising results, but has a number of limitations.  First, 
it is incapable of addressing the problem of correlations between ethogram entries.  
Certain behaviors are more likely to co-occur than others, and because of the videotaped 
monkeys’ movements through their environment as they behaved, camera movements 
were highly correlated with some behaviors.  To avoid false inferences due to these 
correlations, we needed a model that would appropriately account for them.  
Furthermore, the simple PSTH-based method was successful for the two behaviors 
shown (allogrooming and foraging) in part because these are behaviors which tend to 
occur on relatively long timescales, meaning each time bin had a relatively large number 
of observations.  For behaviors which typically occur more briefly (e.g., “Ingest food”), 
distributing their effects across the full 5 second presentation period made the signal 
difficult to extract from the noise even for a relatively large number of observations.  
Similarly, relatively small effects of viewed behaviors on firing rate are difficult to 
capture when the effect is distributed across 25 samples.  These concerns led us to 
develop our firing rate model and fit it against the data.  Figure 17 illustrates the result 
of the firing rate model for the unit shown in Figure 16a. 
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Figure 17: The firing rate model reveals strong modulation of an LPFC neuron’s firing 
rate in response to multiple elements of a video scene, including behaviors. 
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The horizontal axis is logarithmically spaced. 
The model fit confirmed the observation that this unit’s firing rate was positively 
modulated by allogrooming and negatively modulated by foraging, and further 
identified numerous other factors that influenced firing rate, including the presence of 
monkeys in the scene (“Count >= 1”), camera movements (“Camera zooming out,” 
“Camera tracking,” “Camera panning,” and “Camera slewing”), other foraging-related 
behaviors (e.g. “Drink,” “Ingest food,” and “Chew”), and agonistic behaviors (“Joint 
aggression,” “Submit”).  Firing rate was also negatively modulated when the subject 
monkey was looking away from the screen (“Gaze offscreen”), which is consistent with 
the overall lower firing rate associated with less visual stimulation in the blank screen 
condition for this unit.  However, this unit was also strongly negatively modulated by 
the parameter “Proportion gaze offscreen”, suggesting that some features of the 
presented videos which made monkeys less likely to choose to direct their gaze at the 
screen (features which were not otherwise well described by the ethogram) also 
produced an overall lower firing rate for this cell. 
As with the PSTHs, the model result revealed considerable heterogeneity in the 
population of PFC units (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18: Sparse representation of ethogram entries and gaze behavior metrics in 
individual units in prefrontal cortex. Units are ordered within brain region by the 
mean of the absolute value of the log gain over all regressors. 
To estimate the false discovery rate associated with this result, we performed a 
permutation test, according to which for each unit, the relationship between the spike 
count in each bin and the ethogram regressors was randomly permuted, and the model 
then run on the resulting data.  In terms of the model, this entailed substituting for the 
term 𝑥𝑘,𝑛,𝑡−𝜏 some alternative 𝑥𝑘,𝑛′,𝑡′−𝜏, with 𝑛′ and 𝑡
′ chosen by random permutation.  
This permutation test identified no non-zero regressors for any unit, implying a false 
discovery rate of exactly zero.  While this cannot rule out that some regressors were 
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falsely identified as modulating firing rate due to their correlation with other regressors 
which were the true cause of the effect, the result of this permutation test speaks to the 
robustness of the elastic net regression technique. 
To better understand the representation of ethogram and gaze variables in the 
population of PFC units, we counted the number of units exhibiting non-zero 
coefficients for each regressor (Figure 19) as well as the number of regressors with non-
zero coefficients for each unit (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 19: The proportion of units identified as sensitive to each regressor. 
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Figure 20: The proportion of regressors identified with nonzero coefficients for each 
unit. 
The ordering of units (represented along the horizontal axis) within labeled area 
matches that of Figure 18. 
 These results reveal a few notable trends.  Overall, the gaze-related regressors 
appear to be comparatively well represented in both OFC and LPFC.  The overall 
proportion of units sensitive to each viewed behavior was fairly uniform across the set 
of behaviors that we investigated, with the exception of “Grasp food,” “Manipulate 
food,” “Ingest food,” and “Ingest grooming manipuland,” each of which appears to be 
less well-represented than most of the other behaviors.  There are a few possible 
explanations for this.  One possibility is raised by noting that these are all comparatively 
specific behaviors, and nested within “Foraging,” and their lesser degree of 
representation in the population may reflect the relative specificity of their definitions.  
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Another common feature among these behaviors is that they all tend to be relatively 
brief when they occur.  With this in mind, the relatively low representation of these 
behaviors in the model results could reflect limitations in the assumptions that went into 
formulating the model.  In particular, the model assumes that the units’ firing rates will 
respond to each behavior with a boxcar-like profile, lasting exactly as long as the 
behavior is viewed, with a 100 ms lag.  If the true temporal response profile differs from 
this assumption, the model is likely to under-detect true responses, and this effect would 
be more pronounced for shorter-duration behaviors.  However, the proportions of 
responses to “Attack” and “Submit,” behaviors which also tended to be relatively brief, 
were more in line with the rest of the ethogram. 
 OFC units in general appear to be more likely to be sensitive to ethogram 
regressors than units from the LPFC.  The cumulative distribution functions for units 
having a certain proportion of nonzero regressors confirmed this impression (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Firing rates during video presentation of units in OFC tend to encode more 
regressors than those in LPFC. 
Empirical cumulative distribution functions for the proportion of units encoding no 
more than a certain fraction of nonzero model (as in Figure 20) are shown for OFC and 
LPFC.  The curve for OFC is shifted rightward relative to that for LPFC, indicating 
that at each level r, a greater proportion of OFC units were found to have at least r 
nonzero coefficients in the model. 
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4. Conclusion 
4.1 Information foraging 
Our study presented monkeys with an information foraging task, with a 
simulated “environment” consisting of naturalistic, information-rich videos of a diverse 
set of conspecific behaviors.  During the task, monkeys made short-scale orienting 
decisions, “micro-decisions” about where to orient their gaze during video presentation, 
and longer-scale presentation decisions, “macro-decisions” about what kinds of videos 
to view.  Monkeys’ presentation decisions revealed a strong preference for viewing 
videos of conspecifics over viewing a blank screen, and a strong preference for less-
predictable videos over more-predictable videos.  Contrary to our expectations, the 
nature of the viewed videos did not impact monkeys’ presentation decisions.  There are 
several possible explanations that may account for this.  First, monkeys simply may 
have had no preferences among the various behavioral categories in the ethogram.  The 
striking effect of viewed behavioral categories on monkeys’ orienting decisions would 
seem to belie that explanation, but it is possible that these are fundamentally different 
decision processes, with distinct, unrelated preference functions.  A related possibility is 
that monkeys did in fact make presentation decisions based on the viewed information, 
but our ethogram failed to capture the relevant dimensions of the stimuli.  Again, this is 
at odds with the ethogram’s success in explaining at least some of the variability in 
orienting behavior and neural activity.  However, monkeys’ very strong preference for 
 85 
the Switch option over Continue or Repeat suggests that the lack of preferences for 
specific behaviors may have been a consequence of the nature of the “foraging 
environment” that we presented them with.  Although our relatively large video 
database meant monkeys saw the same video sequence within the same behavioral 
session relatively infrequently, all of the subject monkeys performed this task regularly 
over many months, and consequently were eventually exposed to the entire video 
database numerous times.  If monkeys were able to quickly recognize a given video 
sequence, and generally preferred the relative novelty (or at least unpredictability) 
offered by Switch, there may have been little utility in continuing or repeating a given 
video which the monkey already remembered well.  Furthermore, even if monkeys had 
weak preferences for certain kinds of information, it is possible that the cognitive load of 
forming a decision on the basis of the viewed behavior incurred a cost greater than the 
value offered by the information, and so monkeys’ optimal strategy was to rely on 
simpler decision heuristics.  These possibilities suggest a number of alterations to this 
information foraging paradigm.  One option would be to employ a larger stimulus set to 
reduce monkeys’ familiarity with it, but given the challenges of coding such a large 
video database with such a complex ethogram, this may not be practical.  Another 
possibility would be to adjust the menu options to reflect finer decision gradations.  For 
example, offering “Similar” and “Different” options, which lead to presentations chosen 
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based on their ethogram’s correlation with that of the previous presentation, would help 
to balance for the overall level of unpredictability offered by “Switch.” 
4.2 Semantic representations of natural scenes 
The finding that the firing rates of single neurons in prefrontal cortex exhibit 
sparse representations of naturalistic, ethologically meaningful behavioral categories 
viewed in videos of conspecifics complements and extends upon previous findings from 
BOLD fMRI studies in humans.  Huth and colleagues (2012) performed whole brain 
functional scans of human subjects while they viewed a varied set of video stimuli, and 
correlated BOLD responses to a large set of category labels describing the video scenes 
in each 1-second interval using a regularized GLM technique similar to the one 
described here.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, their descriptive model performed best in areas 
typically associated with visual perception, occipital and temporal cortex (particularly 
the superior temporal sulcus and inferotemporal cortex), as well as medial parietal 
cortex.  Intriguingly, they also identified the lateral prefrontal cortex as an area with 
BOLD responses relatively well-predicted by their model.  However, the robustness of 
regularized GLM also allowed them to identify category labels which predicted BOLD 
responses throughout cortex, even in areas where their overall model explained less 
variability in the BOLD signal during movie viewing.  They found sparse representation 
of these categories across cortex, with BOLD responses in spatially localized regions of 
the cortex exhibiting sensitivity to distinct subsets of their semantic category labels. 
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Our study adopted a similar approach in investigating the relationship between 
our ethogram categories and neural activity, but with some important methodological 
differences.  Behaviorally, the human subjects in the study by Huth et al. maintained 
fixation during video presentation, and thus their neurophysiological responses may 
represent more “pure” perceptual representations, while our monkey subjects were free 
to orient their gaze in response to the stimulus, potentially engaging premotor and 
strategic information seeking decision-making systems as well.  While Huth and 
colleagues applied an expansive set of 1,705 category labels to their video database, we 
elected for a more targeted set of 62 distinct ethogram labels selected for their known 
ethological importance to our study species.  Huth and colleagues applied so-called 
“ridge regression” as their regularization technique, while we used the closely related 
but slightly more conservative elastic net technique, which more strongly penalizes 
nonzero terms in the model.  The conservatism of our method likely accounts for our 
model’s high performance in excluding false positives under permutation testing, but 
may bias us toward underreporting the number of ethogram entries which had a 
nonzero influence on the firing rate of our cells.  However, the most significant 
difference between the two studies is in the nature of the physiological response 
measured.  The exact relationship between fMRI BOLD signals and the firing rate 
responses of individual cells or populations of cells remains poorly understood, but the 
best evidence suggests that there is not a simple correlation (Logothetis 2008, Goense & 
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Logothetis 2008, Maier et al. 2008), and thus our results represent an opportunity to 
compare these two signals under similar conditions and analysis regimes.  First, we can 
note that our finding of sparse representations of viewed behavioral categories in the 
firing rates of neurons within OFC and LPFC mirrors the finding of sparse 
representations of viewed categories in BOLD response across cortex, but at a finer 
spatial and temporal scale.   Second, we can consider the implications of the degree of 
information representation we observed in the neuronal firing rates of these areas with 
respect to the fMRI BOLD results.  
4.3 Representations of social information 
Our finding of a sparse representation of viewed behavioral categories in OFC 
and LPFC is highly suggestive of computational processing of this information in these 
areas.  Sparse encoding appears to be a general computational principle in sensory 
systems (Waydo et al. 2006, Quiroga et al. 2008, Carlson et al. 2011, Palm 2013), and in 
this light our finding of sparse encoding of highly processed sensory information 
including viewed categories of behaviors is entirely consistent with work in other brain 
areas using more tightly controlled social stimuli (e.g., Perrett et al. 1984, Perrett et al. 
1985, Friewald et al. 2009).  Visual information arrives in OFC primarily via two 
pathways: one, a dense, specific projection from temporal cortical areas TE and TEO (the 
apex of the so-called “ventral visual stream” for extracting object and identity 
information) to ventrolateral prefrontal area 12l (Carmichael & Price 1995b), a 
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cytoarchitectonically-defined subregion which is tightly linked to both the orbital and 
ventrolateral prefrontal networks (Kadharbatcha et al. 2014); the other, a more diffuse, 
broadly-projecting connection from the basolateral amygdaloid nucleus (Carmichael & 
Price 1995a).  Recent work suggests that even the amygdala sparsely extracts highly 
specific visual information of high behavioral importance such as conspecific eye contact 
(Mosher et al. 2014).  Thus, our findings of sparse representations of natural behavioral 
categories in OFC and LPFC may reflect in part the nature of the visual inputs driving 
these areas. 
An observation in our results that appears at first to be at odds with the 
neuroimaging result of Huth and colleagues (2012) is the finding that while BOLD 
signals in LPFC are more strongly associated with semantic categories than in OFC, we 
found neural firing in OFC to be more strongly associated with ethogram categories 
than in LPFC.  Numerous factors may contribute to this difference, including species, 
stimulus, coding scheme, and task differences, and we cannot directly assess why this 
difference was observed.  However, consideration of the relationship between these two 
regions and the nature of the signals being measured may indirectly resolve the conflict.  
First, Cai and Padoa-Schioppa (2014) proposed a feed-forward model for decision-
making according to which good-based decisions are made in OFC, and the output of 
this is transformed into an action decision in or before LPFC (discussed in further detail 
below).  Second, fMRI BOLD signals often reflect markers of synaptic activity more 
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strongly than spiking activity and thus in some cases reflect inputs to rather than 
spiking activity within a brain area (Logothetis 2008, Ekstrom 2010).  It is possible, 
therefore, that the greater modulation of spiking activity in OFC with viewed categories 
may be reflected in a greater modulation of BOLD-associated physiological responses in 
LPFC, receiving these spiking inputs. 
4.4 Neuroeconomics and Neuroethology 
Historically, the sciences of economics and ecology have mutually benefitted 
from exchanging ideas (Røpke 2004), while often approaching similar questions with 
differing but complementary perspectives.  Both disciplines have parallel behavioral 
(behavioral economics and behavioral ecology or ethology) and mechanistic 
(neuroeconomics and neuroethology) subdisciplines which can also benefit from a 
mutual exchange of ideas.  Neuroeconomics is a highly successful approach to 
investigating brain function with respect to decision-making processes by providing a 
normative theory of behavior in well-defined contexts when rational actor theory 
applies, or when deviations from rationality are well-understood (Glimcher 2004).  
Neuroethology is a similarly successful approach to investigating brain function by 
providing a normative theory of natural behavior rooted in the notion of evolutionary 
adaptation (Ingle & Crews 1985, Carew 2000).  Our study benefits from the productive 
dialogue between these two perspectives in understanding the roles of OFC and LPFC 
in adaptive behavior. 
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A proposal in the neuroeconomic perspective on the mechanisms of decision-
making is the existence of “good-based” value representations, that is, that there exist in 
the brain populations of neurons which can represent the abstract value of any good (a 
stimulus or object in the world which may be targeted for consummatory behavior) in a 
common, unified fashion, and that decision-making occurs within this “goods space,” 
with systems for action selection being engaged only once a good has been selected 
(Padoa-Schioppa 2011).  Such a mechanism offers numerous advantages for complex 
decision-making, including simplicity and scalability.  Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006) 
found evidence that single neurons in OFC do in fact encode common currency value 
representations when monkeys make decisions between stimuli predicting juice rewards 
of different flavors and volumes.  However, such a good-first decision process is not the 
only possible mechanism for making decisions between goods in the environment.  
From a neuroethological perspective, circumstances in which it is possible to make a 
decision purely between goods (which we might identify with the ecological concept of 
resources) may be relatively rare in the natural environment, and so both natural 
selection and phylogenetic conservatism may favor alternative decision processes in 
which both good values and action costs dynamically and interactively contribute to 
flexible decision-making (Cisek 2012).  Nevertheless, Cai and Padoa-Schioppa (2014), by 
presenting monkeys with a decision-making task in which goods and actions were 
spatially and temporally decoupled, found that firing rates of OFC neurons signaled the 
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identity of a selected good, while those of LPFC tracked the subsequent action (a 
saccadic eye movement to a decision target) selected to consume the good, providing 
strong evidence for a goods-based decision process in OFC.  However, it should also be 
considered that the task design of Cai and Padoa-Schioppa strongly favored the 
formation of an early good-based choice, as a delay between menu presentation and the 
appearance of the decision targets incurred a working memory requirement, and the 
consumption action costs were perfectly balanced in every decision, making good value 
the only relevant decision variable.  In other contexts, good value and action costs must 
be tracked more dynamically, and a pure goods-based decision may not be possible 
(Cisek 2012). 
Although our task was not designed to directly test the notion of goods-based 
decision making in OFC or LPFC, our results suggest an important point to consider 
when discussing the notion of value in decision-making tasks.  In an economic 
framework, value is typically identified with revealed preference, that is, it may be 
measured by the subjects’ decisions for or against a good (Samuelson 1948).  From an 
ethological perspective, resources may have adaptive value even if an individual animal 
fails to display overt revealed preferences for them, either because of a maladaptive 
decision-making process, or because a particular context discourages the expression of a 
preference. 
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Our video stimuli presented monkeys with social information of high probable 
adaptive value, had our subjects been in a natural environmental context.  However, in 
using presentation decisions to estimate value, we failed to find any evidence for 
revealed preferences among the various categories of behavior, possibly for contextual 
reasons as discussed above.  Nevertheless, we found considerable evidence that this 
valuable (from an ethological perspective) information was represented in both OFC 
and LPFC.  The representation of social information in OFC even in the absence of its 
strong influence of presentation decisions is consistent with previous findings that over 
twice as many units in OFC represent categories of social information compared to juice 
rewards even when decision-making is dominated by the volume of juice (Watson & 
Platt 2012).  We propose that this apparent conflict can be resolved by considering that 
outside the laboratory context, resources of high ethological value, including social 
information, are much more likely to routinely influence decision-making. 
Under this view, the model that OFC represents the value of “goods” for 
decision-making while LPFC represents the outcome of a good-to-action transformation 
(Cai & Padoa-Schioppa 2014) is consistent with our results, treating the various viewed 
behavioral categories as a set of potential features for decision-making analogous to 
“goods space.”  In our case, although orienting decisions were sensitive to viewed 
behaviors, presentation decisions were not, and this reduction in the relevance of social 
information for producing actions would account for the reduced representation of 
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ethogram categories in LPFC.  If this explanation is correct, we predict that an 
alternative information foraging task that elicits stronger behavioral responses to the 
viewed behaviors, either by altering the nature of the decision or the nature of the 
information environment, will lead to enhanced representation of behavioral categories 
in LPFC.  In this view, the finding that cortical volume in LPFC increases in response to 
increased group size and dominance rank in rhesus macaques (Sallet et al. 2011) may be 
understood as a response to the demands of transforming the representation of social 
information in OFC and likely other brain areas into adaptive information foraging 
actions. 
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